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WALTER W. STEELE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
PERHAPS MORE THAN any other group of lawyers,
those who litigate personal injury and death claims are
forced to solve an intimidating array of ethical problems.
Although some of these ethical problems are common to
all trial lawyers, they are most pervasive in cases with
profound injuries or death.
One can readily find adequate literature that aids cer-
tain groups of lawyers in anticipating and appreciating
ethical problems unique to their practice. For example,
readings for criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors, or tax
lawyers are fairly common.' But one finds precious little
in the way of collections for personal injury lawyers. Per-
haps, in some small way, this paper will add to that body
of writing.
One of the pervasive truths about professional ethics is
that a lawyer who tries to anticipate and avoid ethical
problems may sacrifice his tactical position as a conse-
* LL.B., 1957, Southern Methodist University; LL.M., 1969, University of
Texas. Professor Steele is a member of the faculty at Southern Methodist Univer-
sity School of Law. The author wishes to express gratitude for the contribution
made to this paper by Ms. Joanne Early, candidate for the Juris Doctor degree
from Southern Methodist University.
I See J. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW AND LIABILITY (1986); B.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985); B. WOLFMAN &J. HOLDEN, ETHI-
CAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAx PRACTICE (2d ed. 1985).
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quence. Each lawyer must decide whether the pull of the
adversary system is so strong that the tactical advantages
gained by potentially unprofessional conduct constitute a
professional obligation. This paper is dedicated to those
practitioners who are seeking answers.
II. FEE CONTRACTS
Numerous reasons exist for failure to collect an earned
fee. One reason is failure to have an adequate and profes-
sionally responsible fee contract.' The time to think care-
fully about the fee contract is when the contract is first
formed, not after the case is over. A fee contract is not
binding just because the client signs it. The attorney has
an obligation to explain the contract fully. 5 The unique
circumstances surrounding personal injury representation
indicate that more than ordinary care must be taken to
insure that the client fully understands all ramifications of
the fee contract.
2 Pepe, Professional Responsibility in Pretrial Discovery - A Tale of Two Cities, 64
MicH. B.J. 298, 302 (1985).
[T]he lawyers who aspire to travel the high road often feel they must
abandon it in order to protect their clients .... Only when a code of
ethics and procedural rules are clear in their goals and enforced can
the attorney who wishes to act professionally do so without the risk
of undue prejudice to his client.
Id.
Throughout this Article the references to the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (MODEL CODE) and to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(MODEL RULES) are references to the versions propounded by the American Bar
Association. Each reader is encouraged to compare the ABA versions with the
version existent in the jurisdiction of concern, and each reader is forewarned that
any conclusion reached in this Article may be inapposite in a jurisdiction with a
rule substantially different from the ABA model.
- Some of the following comments about fee contracts are taken from an earlier
article entitled Steele, Creating a Fail-Safe Fee Contract, TRIAL LAW. F., Vol. 23, No. 1,
1988, at 27.
s MODEL CODE EC 2-19 (1981). EC 2-19 states that "[a] lawyer should be mind-
ful that many persons who desire to employ him may have had little or no experi-
ence with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should explain fully to
such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement he proposes." Id. As
to the need for an attorney to avoid suppressing any facts about the fee contract,
see High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 182 N.C. 459, 109 S.E. 378, 383 (1921).
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Identity of Parties
Setting forth the identity of the contracting parties is
basic to the formation of any contract.6 Clients usually
are seeking the services of a particular lawyer. These cli-
ents may become very dissatisfied if they later discover
that another attorney in the firm is handling the case. It
may appear to the client that the lawyer with whom he
thought he had contracted has handed off the matter to
some other, likely unknown, lawyer in the firm. Lawyers
cannot legitimately expect clients to understand the close
working relationship between lawyers associated with one
another on a case. Therefore, if the contracting lawyer
may be joined by other lawyers as the case progresses, the
client and the contracting lawyer should acknowledge this
possibility at the outset with a clear statement in the
contract.
An interesting corollary problem also exists. Suppose a
badly injured client desires an attorney with particular ex-
perience and chooses attorney X. As mentioned above,
the client might reasonably believe that the contract is
with X, when in fact the contract is with X's firm. This
misconception could have been avoided if the contract
had been properly drafted and explained when it was
presented to the client. Continuing with this scenario, if
the contract does not adequately alert the client to the fact
that the contract is with X's firm, what will be the result if
X leaves the firm prior to the completion of the client's
case? Obviously, the client will likely choose to move his
file with X, and clearly he has the right to do so. 7 Whether
the client has any obligation to pay a fee, however calcu-
lated, to the abandoned law firm will turn on the question
of whether the client has a contract with that firm. We can
assume that the firm drafted the contract and that the firm
is more sophisticated than the client. Therefore, we can
also assume that any ambiguities as to whether the firm or
( See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 601, at 608 (1960).
7 L. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 545 (1986). "It is now uniformly recog-
nized that the client-lawyer contract is terminable at will by the client." Id.
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attorney X was the contracting party may be construed in
the client's favor, and the firm may lose its fee.8 From the
firm's perspective, equally disturbing is the argument that
the contract with the firm is one for a unique personal ser-
vice, and therefore cannot be assigned. 9 If the client dis-
charges the firm because the firm, in the absence of the
departed lawyer, can no longer confer the personal ser-
vice in the unique fashion the client contracted for, is the
firm entitled to a fee?
A related matter is that of spouses as contracting par-
ties. Frequently both spouses will have a cause of action,
even though the damages to one spouse may be the domi-
nant factor in the case. Although the damages to one
spouse may be dominant, the fee contract- should include
both spouses as contracting parties. The problem is even
more acute if minors are involved. Under these circum-
stances, the contract must clearly identify both spouses as
separate, individual clients and identify both spouses
jointly as representatives for their minor children.
Courts have held that a contract to pursue a personal
injury matter to "recovery" includes by implication the
obligation to appeal an adverse judgment for no addi-
tional fee, because an appeal is implicit in the process of
"recovery."' 0 Therefore, if the contracting lawyer does
not intend to appeal, or if he intends to establish a differ-
ent fee for appellate services, these matters must be made
explicit in the contract.
Because tax law can play a crucial role in any major per-
sonal injury case, an unwary and unsophisticated client
might reasonably rely upon his personal injury trial attor-
ney for tax advice. Therefore, in order to avoid the very
realistic possibility of a justiciable claim for malpractice, a
personal injury trial lawyer would be wise to place a clause
8 For a discussion of calculating fees when a client discharges a lawyer, see infra
notes 41-86 and accompanying text.
See 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865 (1951).
See Annotation, Construction of Contingent Fee Contract As Regards Compensation for
Services AfterJudgment or on Appeal, 13 A.L.R.3d 673 (1967).
1989] ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 127
in his contracts disclaiming any obligation to render tax
advice and obligating the client to use personal discretion
in the matter of obtaining a tax adviser.
B. Attorney's Fees
More than any other part of the contract, attorney's fees
are of interest to both the client and the lawyer. Although
not commonly done, it might be a good idea to initiate the
topic of contingent fees in the contract with an expression
by the client and the lawyer of the fact that recovery for
the injury is tenuous and not presumed. Some older cases
indicate that a contingent fee contract is justifiable only in
cases in which recovery is not automatic.' 1 The size of the
contingent fee charged in each case depends upon nu-
merous factors.' 2 Both local market forces and the law-
yer's experience and reputation undoubtedly play a major
I A few cases have taken the position that a contingent fee may not be justified
unless there is at least some doubt about the chances of recovery. See City of
Moraine v. Baker, 34 Ohio Misc. 77, 297 N.E.2d 122 (Montgomery County Ct.
C.P. 1971); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1521 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Informal Op. 1521] (stating that a contingent fee
should not be charged if the client is in a position to pay a fixed fee, unless the
client is first offered an option to pay a fixed fee and selects contingent fee) summa-
rized in [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 419 (Nov. 12, 1986); see
also MODEL CODE EC 2-20.
12 See MODEL RULES Rule 1.5 (1983). Rule 1.5 provides:
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal ser-
vice properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
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role in determining the amount of the fee charged.' 3
From the standpoint of the courts, the amount of work
required of the lawyer and the amount of risk of nonpay-
ment assumed by the lawyer are major factors.' 4 Lawyers
who habitually err on the high side in their fee contracts,
with the thought of later reducing the fee if a lower figure
seems justified, should beware. The mere charging of an
excessive fee violates the rules of professional conduct.' 5
American Bar Association (ABA) Informal Opinions
suggest that if a client is able to pay a fixed fee, a contin-
gent fee should not be charged unless the client is first
given the option to select a fixed fee. 6 The ABA seems to
imply that a fixed fee is inherently preferable to a contin-
gent fee, especially for wealthy clients.' 7 Imagine a high
income client who has a moderate whiplash injury in a
case where the chances of recovery are very good. As-
sume that this client prefers a fixed fee. How will the law-
yer set the amount of the fixed fee? There seems to be no
reason to assume that the factors establishing the calculus
for a fixed fee are different from the factors establishing
the calculus for a contingent fee, except one: the lawyer
assumes no risk if the fee is fixed. Consequently, we
might reasonably expect the fixed fee that is ultimately
collected in our hypothetical case to be somewhat smaller
1.3 See Steele, Pricing Behavior of Attorneys, 42 TEX. B.J. 285 (1979), reprinted in 14
FORUM 1060 (1979), and in How TO DETERMINE AND SET PROPER ATrORNEYS FEES
(1978) (State Bar of Texas publication).
,4 Consequently, a contingent fee that is grossly disproportionate to the
amount of work reasonably foreseeable to obtain a result is an excessive fee. An-
derson v. Kenelly, 37 Colo. App. 217, 547 P.2d 260, 261 (1975); see also In re
Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317, 1322 (Del.) (attorney violated Model Code DR 2-106(A)
by assessing a fee of 50% of a disability check), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984).
" MODEL CODE DR 2-106(A). DR 2-106(A) provides: "A lawyer shall not enter
into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee." Id. (em-
phasis added). Note that this language was not carried forward into Model Rule
1.5. But cf MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(a) (stating that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reason-
able," but not indicating whether reasonableness should be determined as of the
time the fee is initially agreed upon or the time the fee is actually billed).
" See ABA Informal Op. 1521, supra note 11; MODEL CODE EC 2-20.
MODEL CODE EC 2-20. EC 2-20 provides: "[A] lawyer generally should de-
cline to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a
reasonable fixed fee . I.. Id. (emphasis added).
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than a contingent fee would be, because the lawyer has
assumed no risk with the fixed fee. But, whenever a law-
yer assumes no risk because his fee is fixed, the client as-
sumes a corresponding obligation to pay because the fee
is fixed! Thus, the ABA's seemingly implicit notion that a
fixed fee may be fairer than a contingent fee seems to lose
some of its appeal.
Once the contract is clear and precise as to the fee
formula, the next drafting problem is to clarify precisely
when the fee is payable. As might be expected, the rule of
thumb is that the lawyer gets paid when the client gets
paid.' 8 Prior to the advent of the structured settlement,
few would have quarreled with this rule of thumb. Struc-
tured settlements, however, have rearranged all of this.
Because of a structured settlement's characteristics, ad-
ditional contract clauses conditioned on a possible struc-
tured settlement must be placed in the fee contract if the
case is of major proportions. In essence, there must be
two contracts in one: (1) a contract to cover both fees and
payment if lump sum settlement results, and (2) another
contract to cover fees and payment if the eventual settle-
ment is a structured one. Extreme care must be used in
drafting structured settlement clauses because courts are
unsettled on the issue of excessive fees in structured set-
tlement cases.'9 The apparent reason for the ambiguity
Is See, e.g., Cardenas v. Ramsey County, 322 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Minn. 1982)
(finding that the word "recovered" in a contingent fee contract means "received"
in that the attorney is entitled to one-third of each payment his client receives
under the structured settlement as and when he receives it).
, Extended value calculation has been held excessive by several courts. See,
e.g., Florida Bar v. Gentry, 475 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1985) (attorney's fee was excessive
because the structured settlement was not reduced to present value). Present
value calculation has been approved provided the client contracted for that
method of calculation. See Godwin v. Schramm, 731 F.2d 153, 158 (3d Cir.) ("It
may be . . .that contingent services are susceptible of determination by experts
and reducible to present value. If so, computation of counsel fees on such a basis
may not violate the [FTCA] ...."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984). In other
cases, the present value calculation has been rejected as excessive and actual cost
has been used instead. See Wyatt v. United States, 783 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[I]t is clear to us that absent the submission of any contrary evidence the pres-
ent value of the structured settlement in this case was, in fact, the cost of that
settlement, namely, what it took in money to produce the agreed settlement pay-
1989] 129
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and lack of agreement about fees in structured settle-
ments is probably due to the fact that most structured set-
tlements are negotiated privately on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, the courts have not been presented with significant
opportunities to examine this new settlement modality.
The terms of the fee contract may turn out to be very
persuasive with the court. Courts may view the terms of
the contract as persuasive in a structured settlement case
because of the appealing argument that because the con-
tract is clear and precise, and because the client agreed
with the lawyer to those contract terms in advance, the
contract terms should bind both parties and not be de-
clared excessive. 20 Perez v. Pappas2' is a perfect example.
In Perez the lawyer for the plaintiff renegotiated his fee af-
ter a settlement was reached, in part because the settle-
ment was structured. The Supreme Court of Washington
noted that structured settlements often do not readily
lend themselves to the customary calculations of contin-
gent fee agreements. Therefore, an attorney and client
may have to reconsider the calculation of fees if a struc-
tured settlement is reached. 22 The court went on to com-
ment that lawyers who seek to renegotiate their fee
contracts must bear in mind the common law rule that the
attorney/client relationship is a fiduciary one, and that the
renegotiation of contracts will be very carefully
ments over the entire period involved."). The courts in both of these Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) cases stressed that the terms of the fee contract as writ-
ten were significant to the decision.
2" For a complete discussion arguing for valuation under the actual cost
method, and emphasizing the importance of the terms of the fee contract itself,
see Pryor, Methods In Determining Fees In Structured Settlement ,Cases, 49 TEX. B.J. 68
(1986). For a review of recent cases, most of which reject all calculations other
than actual costs, see Annotation, Propriety and Effect of "Structured Settlements"
Whereby Damages Are Paid in Installments Over a Period of Time, and Attorneys' Fees Ar-
rangements in Relation Thereto, 31 A.L.R.4th 95 (1984).
2 98 Wash. 2d 835, 659 P.2d 475 (1983) (en banc).
2 d. at 835, 659 P.2d at 478. The court stated: "Oftentimes, structured settle-
ments do not readily lend themselves to the usual course of calculating fees pur-
suant to contingent fee agreements. Therefore, when a structured settlement is
reached, the attorney and client may have to reconsider and discuss the calcula-
tion of fees." Id.
ETHICAL CONSIDERA TIONS
scrutinized.23
Renegotiation of the contract and its consequent close
scrutiny can be avoided entirely if plaintiffs' lawyers adopt
a practice of maintaining two standard forms of fee con-
tracts instead of only one. One standard form would be
the contract now used by most lawyers, except that its use
would be limited to cases in which no reason to anticipate
the use of structured settlement existed. The second or
"new" standard form contract would contain all of the
structured settlement clauses necessary to clearly and ex-
plicitly set forth the agreement of the parties as to all as-
pects of the potential structured settlement, such as
agreements as to timing of fee payment and the value of
the fund from which contingency will be calculated. This
two-contract proposal has several advantages. For exam-
ple, the lawyer will not be required to explain or delete
structured settlement clauses in a contract that he uses
with a client in a smaller case. This will save time and
possible disappointment for the client. Another advan-
tage is that the very existence of a contract which is writ-
ten especially for structured settlement cases is ample
evidence that the client and the lawyer carefully consid-
ered their respective contractual rights and obligations.
III. REPRESENTING MULTIPLE CLIENTS JOINTLY
Frequently, multiple clients with the same interests seek
joint representation from a single lawyer. For example,
several victims of a single tort or all defendants in a single
case may seek joint representation. In many of these situ-
ations there is a "lead" client who may very well have
some previous connection with the lawyer. The client, at
least to some degree, is responsible for bringing the other
clients along. Realistically, in such a situation a lawyer
probably has a reason to favor the interests of the "lead"
client over the interests of the other clients in the group.
Such a conflict of interests may be subtle; or it may not be
23 Id. at 835, 659 P.2d at 479.
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so subtle. Lawyers must pay careful attention to Rule
1.7(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), which prohibits a lawyer from representing a cli-
ent if representing that client may materially limit the law-
yer's loyalties to other clients in the group.24 Model Rule
1.7(b)(2) provides that "when representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the com-
mon representation and the advantages and risks in-
volved." '25 Explanation of the risks requires full disclosure
of the risks involved. 6 The danger of conflict of interest
is inherent in any joint representation of multiple clients.
Settlement of cases where multiple clients are involved
presents even further difficulties. Model Rule 1.8(g)2 7
and Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-10628 require a lawyer to
advise each of the multiple clients of the aggregate amount
of the settlement and of the participation of each client
therein.
Few cases discuss the ethical principles involved in
-4 MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b).
2-. Id. Rule 1.7(b)(2).
26 Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 487 A.2d 197, 199 n.5 (1985) (requiring
an attorney to explain in detail the risks and foreseeable pitfalls that may arise, so
that the client is able to understand that it might be preferable for him to have
independent counsel).
27 MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(g). Rule 1.8(g) provides:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the cli-
ents, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or
nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after consulta-
tion, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the
claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in
the settlement.
Id.
Id.2 MODEL CODE DR 5-106. DR 5-106 provides:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or par-
ticipate in the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or
against his clients, unless each client has consented to the settlement
after being advised of the existence and nature of all the claims in-
volved in the proposed settlement, of the total amount of the settle-
ment, and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
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jointly representing multiple clients. DR 5-106 was held
to be adequately specific, and therefore, constitutional, by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in In re Charges of Unpro-
fessional Conduct Against N. P. 29 An example of an attorney
scrupulously obeying the rules can be found in In re
Guardianship of Lauderdale, °3 in which the attorney dis-
cussed the aggregate settlement with all of the adult cli-
ents and with the guardian ad litem for the minors, and
then made a recommendation for apportionment of the
aggregate settlement that was accepted by all.
A Texas case, Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. ,31 invali-
dated an aggregate settlement because it violated DR 5-
106.32 The facts are quite unique. The Quintero family
hired attorney Gonzalez to file a law suit because Jim Wal-
ter Homes failed to provide them with a house of good,
workmanlike quality." Gonzalez, after obtaining the
Quinteros' permission, associated attorney Gandy to try
the case. Gandy tried the case and obtained a $78,000
judgment in favor of the Quinteros.3 a Incredibly, without
knowledge of Gandy's judgment, Gonzalez proceeded to
negotiate an aggregate settlement with Jim Walter Homes
on behalf of 349 of his clients, including the Quinteros,
for $1.8 million. Gonzalez calculated that the Quinteros
would receive approximately $14,000 from that aggregate
settlement.3 5
Needless to say, the Quinteros preferred the $78,000
judgment obtained by Gandy. Consequently, the
Quinteros proceeded to bring an action to set aside the
aggregate settlement that Gonzalez negotiated with Jim
Walter Homes. The court supported the contention of
the Quinteros that Gonzalez violated DR 5-106 by not dis-
2s, 361 N.W.2d 386, 389, 394 (Minn.), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 926 (1985).
15 Wash. App. 321, 549 P.2d 42 (1976).
709 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
.' Id. at 229.
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cussing the aggregate settlement with his clients.36 Be-
cause Gonzalez failed to fully inform the Quinteros of the
settlement before obtaining their consent, the court inval-
idated the aggregate settlement and ordered the $78,000
judgment in favor of the Quinteros to be enforced. 7
Although the problems of jointly representing multiple
clients are seldom litigated, it is apparent that joint repre-
sentation is a trap for the unwary. This trap is made all
the more appealing by the fact that such representation
usually enhances the size of the eventual recovery and
hence enhances the fee. Nevertheless, attorneys must be
extremely wary when they face a multiple client opportu-
nity. One innovative attorney attempted to alleviate some
of the potential problems by having all clients in the
group agree in advance that the majority would control
decisions about whether to accept a settlement.3 8 Eventu-
ally, a settlement offer was submitted to the clients and a
clear majority of them voted to accept it. Unfortunately
for the lawyer, a few of the dissenting clients sued to set
the settlement aside.3 9 The court held that the advance
agreement to allow majority control of settlement deci-
sions was void and a violation of the attorney's obligation
to each of his clients as set forth in DR 5-106.4o
-', Id. at 229. The court stated that "[t]he Quinteros were not informed of the
nature and settlement amounts of all the claims involved in the aggregate settle-
ment, nor were they given a list showing the names and amounts to be received by
the other settling plaintiffs." Id.
-7 Id. at 231.
Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc., 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894-95. The court stated:
We hold that the arrangement presented allowing the majority to
govern the rights of the minority is violative of the basic tenets of the
attorney-client relationship in that it delegates to the attorney pow-
ers which allow him to set not only contrary to the wishes of his




IV. TERMINATION OF THE ATF'ORNEY/CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
By undertaking to represent a client, an attorney im-
pliedly agrees to serve throughout the duration of the
case. 4' On the other hand, clients can terminate an attor-
ney at any time for any reason.42 Clients are provided this
extraordinary option because of the need for confidence
and trust in an effective attorney/client relationship. 43
The fact that an attorney is retained under a contingency
fee contract in no way affects the client's right to dis-
charge him at will. 4
Although a client has the right to discharge a lawyer at
will, if the discharge is not legally justifiable, the client
must pay the lawyer some measure of damages. Similarly,
if a lawyer withdraws from the representation for legally
justifiable reasons, the lawyer is entitled to some measure
of payment for services rendered. That the attorney with-
draws, as opposed to being discharged by the client, does
not determine whether the attorney is precluded from re-
ceiving compensation for his services. 45 Thus, determin-
ing whether the attorney/client relationship was
terminated with or without a legally justifiable cause is the
first step in deciding the amount of compensation to
which an attorney is entitled. Courts tend not to distin-
guish between rights to compensation created by wrong-
ful discharge and rights to compensation created by
41 1 S. SPEISER, ATrORNEYS' FEES § 4:10 (1973) (citing Fairchild v. General Mo-
tors Acceptance Corp., 254 Miss. 261, 179 So. 2d 185 (1965)).
42 Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Mo. 1982). Attor-
neys employed under a contingent fee contract who were discharged without
cause before settlement or judgment, and who had rendered legal services, were
limited to recovery of the reasonable value of services rendered, not greater than
the contract fee and payable only upon occurrence of the contingency. Id.
4 Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 1982). The fact that the
client may not rely entirely on good faith efforts of the attorney dictates that cli-
ents be given greater freedom to change legal representatives than might be toler-
ated in other employment relationships. Id.
44 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 41, § 4:32 (citing cases from the District of Columbia,
California, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, and Washington).
4-1 See generally Annotation, Circumstances Under Which Attorney Retains Right to Com-
pensation Notwithstanding Voluntary Withdrawal From Case, 88 A.L.R.3d 246 (1978).
1989]
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legally justifiable withdrawal.46
A. Conduct that Justifies Attorney's Withdrawal
Guidelines for justifiable withdrawal are established in
the rules of professional responsibility.4 7 Reasons for
withdrawal include the following: (1) continuation of the
46 See, e.g., Reed Yates Farms v. Yates, 172 Ill. App. 3d 519, 526 N.E.2d 1115,
1124-25 (1988) (holding that quantum meruit recovery is applicable to situations
involving discharge of an attorney without cause, as well as those involving the
attorney withdrawing for good cause).
47 See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16. The rule provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from
the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs
the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without ma-
terial adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime
or fraud;
(3) the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the law-
yer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable
warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is ful-
filled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial bur-
den on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the
client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue
representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such
as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employ-
ment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that
has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the
client to the extent permitted by other law.
Id.; see also MODEL CODE DR 2-1 1O(B)-(C) (the language of DR 2-1 1O(B)-(C) is
similar to that of Model Rule 1.16).
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employment will result in the attorney violating rules of
professional responsibility; (2) the lawyer's health makes
the representation unreasonably difficult; (3) the client
fails to fulfill his obligations to the lawyer; and (4) the cli-
ent insists upon services that the lawyer considers repug-
nant.48 The courts have recognized other justifications
for withdrawal. These reasons include: (1) conduct on the
part of the client that degrades or humiliates the attor-
ney;4 9 (2) retention by the client of any additional counsel
who are personally or professionally objectionable to the
attorney originally retained;5 0  and (3) lack of
cooperation.5
A client's refusal to accept a settlement offer does not
justify withdrawal.52 The Model Rules require that an at-
torney "abide by a client's decision to accept or to reject a
settlement offer. '53 If, however, in addition to refusing a
settlement offer, the client has also engaged in conduct
that might "independently justify withdrawal," then it is
possible that the attorney's right to compensation will not
48 See MODEL CODE DR 2-110(B)-(C); MODEL RULES Rule 1.16.
49 See, e.g., Fishman v. Conway, 57 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (client made
herself most obnoxious to her attorneys and to the court, she indicated plainly
that she was dissatisfied with the attorney's service, and she wrote a letter to the
grievance committee charging that the attorneys were attempting to take her be-
longings from her).
" See, e.g., Tenney v. Berger, 93 N.Y. 524 (1883) (client retained additional and
professionally objectionable counsel without the original attorney's knowledge or
consent). Note, however, that the mere retention of other counsel by the client
does not justify the first attorney's withdrawal. Seasongood v. Prager, 146 A.D.
833, 131 N.Y.S. 771 (App. Div. 1911).
.11 See, e.g., Hancock v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 472 A.2d 867 (D.C. 1984)
(client left telephone calls and letters unanswered and made no arrangement to
pay attorney for past services).
- Many courts have considered the issue of the relative rights of the parties
when a client refuses to accept a settlement offer. Although the client's refusal to
accept the settlement may be foolish, the courts uniformly hold that the refusal is
not in the nature of a breach of contract. If an attorney withdraws because his
client refuses to accept a settlement offer, the attorney is not entitled to a fee.
Bernard v. Moretti, 34 Ohio App. 3d 317, 518 N.E.2d 599 (1987); see also May v.
Seibert, 164 W. Va. 673, 264 S.E.2d 643 (1980).
." MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a). The rule provides in part that "[a] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."
Id.
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be affected if he withdraws. 54 Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co. 5
5
is a useful example. In Ambrose, the court found circum-
stances that justified the attorney's withdrawal, although
the withdrawal in part resulted from the client's refusal to
accept a settlement offer. The court focused on the "total
lack of communication" between the client and the attor-
neys, as well as the client's uncooperative attitude. For
example, the client refused to elect between receiving
payment of benefits from the defendant based solely on
the life of the client or, alternatively, payment based on
both the lives of the client and his wife.5 6 Additionally, the
trial judge concluded that the heart of the problem was
the client's desire to "get back at" the defendants. Appar-
ently the client also had grown so accustomed to the liti-
gation that he would miss it if the suit settled.
Consequently, the court held that the client's "irrational"
refusal to settle, combined with the additional circum-
stances, provided the attorneys with good cause to with-
draw and preserved their right to a fee.57
B. Right to Compensation If Client Discharges Attorney
Without Cause or Attorney Withdraws with Cause
Jurisdictions differ as to determing proper compensa-
tion for an attorney discharged without cause. Most states
have adopted either the contract rule or the modern
rule.58 According to the contract rule, an attorney is enti-
tled to the entire contingent fee if the client wrongfully
discharges him.59 The modern rule, on the other hand,
limits the attorney's recovery to the reasonable value of
his services rendered prior to the discharge.6 °
.4 May, 164 W. Va. at 673, 264 S.E.2d at 646.
65 Mich. App. 484, 237 N.W.2d 520 (1975).
Id. at 484, 237 N.W.2d at 523.
.17 Id. at 484, 237 N.W.2d at 524.
- Note, Client Discharging Attorney Without Cause Pursuant to a Contingency Fee Agree-
ment: Limited in Missouri to Quantum Meruit Not to Exceed the Contract Fee-Upon Occur-
rence of the Contingency, 51 UMKC L. REv. 373 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Client
Discharging].
' Id. at 373.
""Id.
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Commentators suggest that the justification for the con-
tract rule, which allows the attorney to collect his entire
contingent fee, is tied to the policy underlying the contin-
gent fee itself.6 Because the contingent fee arrangement
is perceived as the "poor man's key to the courthouse
door, ' 6 2 some commentators believe that protecting the
attorney's economic interest provides an incentive for at-
torneys to utilize the contingent fee modality, thereby
making the judicial system available for all.63 Not all com-
mentators believe that attorneys are motivated to use the
contingent fee modality out of concern for clients who
could not otherwise afford an attorney's services. Perhaps
attorneys adopt this fee structure because it is economi-
cally advantageous for them to do so, and because the
public has come to expect attorneys to employ this fee
structure.
Other justifications for the contract rule include the fol-
lowing ideas: (1) valuing an attorney's services is so diffi-
cult that it is impossible to value partially completed legal
work; (2) attorneys' services are not easily divisible be-
cause many services are rendered before formal legal ac-
tions or court proceedings are initiated; (3) the parties
agreed upon the full contract price as the value of the
services, and no other rational measure of damages is
available; and (4) the client should be charged the full fee
so that he does not profit from his own breach.'
The modern rule, which limits fee recovery to quantum
meruit, is followed in at least nineteen jurisdictions.6 5
- Note, Attorney's Right to Compensation When Discharged Without Cause From a Con-
tingent Fee Contract - Covington v. Rhodes, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 680-82
(1979) [hereinafter Note, Attorney's Right].
'' Id. at 681.
'I' ld. at 682.
,' Note, An Attorney Discharged Without Cause Under a Contingent Fee Contract is Lim-
ited to Quantum Meruit Recovery, and Recovery is Dependent Upon the Client's Ultimate
Recovery in the Underlying Action, 41 CIN. L. REV. 1002, 1004 (1972) (now titled U.
CIN. L. REV.).
';. Annotation, Limitation to Quantum Meruit Recovery, Where Attorney Employed
Under Contingent Fee Contract is Discharged Without Cause, 92 A.L.R.3d 690, 694-96
(1979). The jurisdictions that limit recovery to quantum meruit are Alaska, Ari-
zona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
1989] 139
140 JOURNAL OF AIR IA WAND COMMERCE [55
The premise of this modern rule is that the right to dis-
charge an attorney is of little value if the cost of exercising
that right is prohibitive, such as when the client is re-
quired to pay the full fee contracted at the outset of the
relationship. 6 The modern rule has been praised for pro-
viding clients more freedom in substituting counsel and
for promoting confidence in the legal profession.6 7 The
rule has been criticized, however, because it hinders the
attorney's ability to calculate the risks involved in setting
the contingent fee.68
Growing acceptance of the modern rule has added sev-
eral issues to the analysis of fees and the withdrawn or
discharged attorney. For instance, when should a dis-
charged attorney receive his fee? The decisions fall into
two camps. The approach taken by California courts is
that a discharged attorney's claim does not accrue until
the contingency in the contract actually occurs.69 Several
theories support this approach. First, it is unfair to im-
pose on the client an absolute obligation to pay the origi-
nal attorney regardless of the outcome of the litigation, °
particularly in light of the fact that the attorney initially
assumed the risk of not collecting a fee at all. 7' An addi-
tional supporting theory is that the result ultimately ob-
tained by the client is a significant factor in determining
the reasonable value of the discharged attorney's serv-
ices.72 On the other hand, the approach of New York
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
1w; Note, Attorney s Right, supra note 61, at 680 (citing Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d
784, 789, 494 P.2d 9, 12, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1972)).
67 Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982). The court held that
an attorney who is discharged without cause is entitled to quantum meruit, but the
recovery must be limited to the maximum contract fee, otherwise the client is
penalized for discharging the attorney and the attorney receives more than he
bargained for in the original contract. Id. at 1017.
" Note, Client Discharging, supra note 58, at 378.
I , d. at 379-80; see also Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 791, 494 P.2d at 14, 100 Cal. Rptr.
at 390.




courts is that a discharged attorney's claim accrues upon
discharge. 7 This viewpoint assumes that the value of the
original attorney's services is remotely, if at all, related to
the results obtained by the replacement attorney. 74 Ac-
cording to this view, because the client rescinded the con-
tract, the contingency aspect of the contract also was
rescinded.75
Another question posed by the modern rule is how the
reasonable value, or quantum meruit, of the attorney's
services is to be valued. No uniform method is utilized to
arrive at a "reasonable" fee in the event of discharge
under the modern rule. Often the terms of the contract
are considered in determining the amount of recovery.76
Other factors include special skills the attorney may have
employed, the complexity of the case, the size of the case
in terms of dollars, the caliber of the services provided,
the fees generally charged for similar work, the time spent
on the case, and the success achieved.77
In Salem Realty Co. v. Matera,78  the Massachusetts
Supreme Court recognized the possibility that an attorney
who had rendered substantial performance prior to being
discharged might recover the full contingent fee.79 The
court stated that in deciding whether or not to award the
full amount the following factors should be weighed: (1)
7-1 Paulsen v. Halpin, 74 A.D.2d 990, 427 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (App. Div. 1980)
(an attorney may sue immediately after the contract is terminated and the court
will look to the totality of the circumstances to determine a reasonable fee for the
attorney).
74 Tillman v. Komar, 259 N.Y. 133, 134, 181 N.E. 75, 76 (1932) (the court rec-
ognized the client's right to cancel the contract with his attorney, but upon cancel-
lation the contract fails and the attorney may sue for the reasonable value of his
services).
7. Fracasse, 6 Cal. 3d at 804, 494 P.2d at 23, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting) (the dissent's reasoning was that the attorney bargained for limited
risks under the contract that the case might be unsuccessful, but did not bargain
for the risk that his client might discharge him and select an incompetent
attorney).
76 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 41, § 4:36.
77 Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 410 N.E.2d 716, 719
(1980), aft'd, 384 Mass. 803, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (1981).
78 384 Mass. 803, 426 N.E.2d 1160 (1981).
71, Id. at 803, 426 N.E.2d at 1161.
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the bad faith of the terminating client; (2) the extent of
the lawyer's performance left incomplete; (3) the cost to
the client for the legal services necessary to complete the
finished work; (4) the conduct of the attorney; and (5) the
wording of the agreement.8 0
Another method of determining reasonable compensa-
tion is to apportion the fee from a single contingent fee
contract between the original attorney and the new attor-
ney. Should the fee generated by the contingency not be
sufficient to satisfy the quantum meruit claims of both the
original and existing counsel, the use of a pro rata
formula to distribute the fee between the two lawyers may
be appropriate.8 ' Certainly the notion of apportioning
the fee from a single contract protects the client from pay-
ing double fees.
C. Discharge With Cause or Withdrawal Without Cause
Both an attorney discharged by a client who has legally
adequate cause to discharge and an attorney who with-
draws without legally adequate cause forfeit any right to
compensation, according to the prevailing rule. 2 Two re-
cent cases suggest that courts may be softening this posi-
tion. In the first case, a Texas court awarded a fee
representing the value of services rendered by an attorney
who was discharged with legally adequate cause.8 3 The
conduct that justified the discharge included being rude
and impatient with the client, postponing the trial without
the client's knowledge or consent, and missing appoint-
ments.8 4 In the second case, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, after finding that the attorney withdrew
because the client refused to accept a settlement recom-
mendation, permitted the attorney to recover the value of
Io /d.
Spires v. American Bus Lines, 158 Cal. App. 3d 211, 204 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533
(1984).
"2 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 41, § 4:10; see also Staples v. McKnight, 763 S.W.2d
914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
83 Rocha v. Abmad, 676 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
"4 Id. at 155.
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the services to the date of withdrawal.8 5 In this particular
case, the client was not prejudiced by the attorney's with-
drawal and the court concluded that forfeiture of all com-
pensation was too severe a penalty for the attorney to
pay.86
V. INVESTIGATION
Not all lawyers are personally involved with the investi-
gation of claims. All lawyers, however, recognize the im-
portance of investigation, and some lawyers occasionally
direct the investigative efforts of others. Undeniably, the
rules of professional responsibility do not focus on the
topic of investigation. This fact is attributable to the often
repeated complaint that the rules inadequately treat some
aspects of practicing law. Nevertheless, the rules address
two parts of investigation: contact with adverse parties
and surreptitious recording of conversations.
A. Contact with Adverse Parties
Both the Model Code and Model Rules prohibit a law-
yer from having any ex parte communication with an op-
posing party who is represented by counsel.8 7 Although
the wisdom of these rules appears to be self-evident, every
litigator knows that they become problematical when a
". May v. Seibert, 164 W. Va. 673, 264 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1980).
Id. at 673, 264 S.E.2d at 647. The court determined that the client was not
prejudiced by the attorney's withdrawal because within a few months the client
accepted a settlement at the same amount originally obtained by the first attorney.
ld.
I8 MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(1); MODEL RULES Rule 4.2. The Disciplinary Rule
states:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of
the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a law-
yer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer rep-
resenting such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(1). Rule 4.2 states: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer
has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." MODEL
RULES Rule 4.2; see also Annotation, Attorneys' Dealing Directly With Client of Another
Attorney as Ground for Disciplinary Proceeding, 1 A.L.R.3d 1113 (1965).
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case is in the investigative stage. For example, the rules
may limit the opportunity to obtain information from em-
ployees or agents of adverse parties. Without the consent
of the plaintiff's attorney, can a lawyer for the defendant
contact a plaintiff's employees to investigate the extent
and nature of any preexisting disability the plaintiff might
have? Can a lawyer contact the spouse of a represented
party? The rules leave us without guidance. The few per-
tinent court decisions concern institutional clients such as
corporations. Those cases hold that employees of repre-
sented institutions may be contacted ex parte as long as the
employees do not hold managerial positions that give
them the authority to speak for and bind the institution. 8
Note that the practice is altogether different if the op-
posing part is not represented. No rules of professional
responsibility limit ex parte contact with an unrepresented
adverse party.8 9 Thus, investigation, or even negotiation
with an unrepresented opposition party, may proceed
apace. DR 7-104(A)(2) expressly prohibits a lawyer from
giving legal advice to an unrepresented adverse party.90
8 See Annotation, Right of Attorney to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews With Corporate
Party's Nonmanagement Employees, 50 A.L.R.4th 652 (1986).
m, Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702,
733-34 (1977).
MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(2). DR 7-104(A)(2) states:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not
* . . [g]ive advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer,
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such per-
son are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the
interest of his client.
Id.; see MODEL RULES Rule 4.3. Rule 4.3 states:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disin-
terested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding.
Id. See also MODEL RULES Rule 8.4. Rule 8.4 states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to
violate the rules of professional conduct, knowlingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
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As a practical matter, it may be quite difficult to engage in
some forms of investigation without giving legal advice.
The same holds true for most forms of negotiation that
involve contact with the opposing party.
W. T. Grant Co. v. Haines9  more than adequately
presents these issues.9 2 W.T. Grant, a mercantile com-
pany, had been investigating the activities of several em-
ployees, among them Mark Haines. Haines was in
charge of store leases. 4 Grant decided to file suit against
Haines and other employees, claiming various acts of
fraud against the interests of the company. 5 On the same
morning that its lawyers filed suit in federal court, Grant
officials called the employees to a meeting.96 When the
employees arrived, they were told that the meeting was
cancelled. Immediately thereafter, company attorneys in-
terrogated Haines, who did not know that the suit had
been filed. During the interrogation Haines made numer-
ous statements against his interests and was fired at the
close of the interrogation.9 7
Haines moved to have the case against him dismissed
on the grounds that when the Grant attorneys interro-
gated him, they violated DR 7-104(A)(1), which prohibits
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
agency or official;
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.
Id. Sometimes, adjustors or investigators are used to negotiate as well as to inves-,
tigate. Note that both DR 1-102(A)(2) and Model Rule 8.4 prohibit a lawyer from
violating the rules through an agent. Clearly, however, not all adjustors operate
as agents of lawyers. Obviously, an independent lay person adjustor is not bound
by the rules of professional responsibility.
531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976).
" For a more thorough analysis of these issues and of the Grant case, see Pene-
gar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 348-55 (1988).
1,s Grant, 531 F.2d at 673.
1 Id. at 672.
!,Id. at 672-73.
1, Id. at 673.
97 Id. at 674.
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communication with represented adverse parties.98
Haines admitted that he was not literally within the scope
of DR 7-104(A)(1) because he was not represented by
counsel during the interrogation. Haines argued (not
without logic perhaps) that because the Grant lawyers
purposely failed to advise him that a suit had been filed
and had lured him to a meeting so that he might be con-
veniently interrogated, the type of harm sought to be
avoided by DR 7-104(A)(1) had in fact occurred. The
court rather casually dismissed Haines' argument, stating
that he was a sophisticated businessman, hardly deserving
of the kind of consideration the court might afford a be-
fuddled widow under the same circumstances. 99
Undeterred, Haines presented a second argument to
the court. He claimed that the Grant attorneys violated
DR 7-104(A)(2), which prohibits giving legal advice to an
unrepresented adverse party, because they gave him ad-
vice during the course of the interrogation. 00 Because
the Grant lawyers spoke with Haines at the interrogation
about waiving some of his rights, the court concluded that
they did violate DR 7-104(A)(2).' 0 Ironically, the court
also concluded that the violation would not disqualify the
lawyers from continuing to represent Grant.10 2
Grant is more than just an interesting example of the
interplay of the rules about contact with adverse parties.
The case demonstrates how difficult it can be to conduct
an investigation or a negotiation without giving legal ad-
vice. Furthermore, Grant may be seen as a case that trivial-
izes the rules to some extent. Some, at least, would argue
that the facts in Grant are much more compelling than in-
dicated by the result reached by the court.
" d.; see supra note 87 for the text of DR 7-104(A)(1).
Grant, 531 F.2d at 674.
.. Id. at 675; see supra note 90 for the text of DR 7-104(A)(2).
Grant, 531 F.2d at 675.
'"'2 Id. at 677. "The business of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act
as a general overseer of the ethics of those who practice here unless that ques-
tioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before it." Id.
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B. Surreptitious Recording of Conversation
The second aspect of investigation that the rules of pro-
fessional conduct address is the surreptitious recording of
a party to a conversation. Legally, any party to a conver-
sation may clandestinely record the conversation. For a
lawyer to do so, however, raises the specter of Canon 9 of
the Model Code, which states that "[a] lawyer should
avoid even the appearance of professional impropri-
ety.""' One can imagine numerous strategic reasons for
a lawyer to secretly record a conversation. The reasons
may range from recording client interviews in order to
avoid taking notes during the interview to recording hos-
tile witnesses or suspected perjurers for future impeach-
ment. In fact, one makes a pivotal value choice in
concluding that clandestine recording by a lawyer violates
Canon 9 per se. The contrary value choice is that in many
cases clandestine recording promotes the central con-
cepts of truth and justice far more than the appearance of
impropriety damages these concepts. Indeed, it was not
until the Nixonesque days that jurisdictions began to hold
clandestine recording unethical.
The first major step in the process of declaring clandes-
tine recording professionally unethical came in 1974 with
ABA Formal Opinion 337, which prohibits an attorney
from recording a conversation without the prior knowl-
edge or consent of all parties involved.10 4 Other jurisdic-
tions quickly followed suit. 10 5 As might be expected, the
courts began to take similar positions. National Life &Acci-
'". MODEL CODE Canon 9.
'" ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 337
(1974) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 337], reprinted in ABA STANDING COMM. ON
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPIN-
IONS: FORMAL OPIONS 316-348, INFORMAL OPINIONS 1285-1495, at 94 (1985).
Opinion 337 states that "no lawyer should record any conversation, whether by
tape or other electronic device, without consent or prior knowledge of all parties
to the conversation." Id.
,o, See, e.g., State Bar of Texas Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, Op. 392 (1978), reprinted in 41 Tex. B.J. 580 (1978), (over-
ruling Texas Opinion 84 (1953), reprinted in 16 Tex. B.J. 703 (1953)).
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dent Insurance Co. v. Miller '0 6 is a useful example. The in-
surance company in National denied coverage on the
theory of application fraud. Consequently, the principal
issue in the case involved what the claimant said, or did
not say, to the insurance agent at the time the application
for insurance was taken. The lawyer for the claimant sus-
pected that the insurance agent was a liar. To prove it,
the lawyer for the claimant instructed the claimant to
place a telephone call to the insurance agent from the law-
yer's office and clandestinely recorded the call. The agent
told the truth during the phone conversation. Later, the
recorded conversation was used at trial as impeaching
evidence. 0 7
Thus, the facts in National clearly present two value
choices. One choice is that the lawyer's conduct has the
appearance of impropriety and therefore should be con-
demned as a breach of professional ethics. Perhaps the
evidence acquired as a result of the lawyer's unethical
conduct also should not be used. Another possible choice
is that the claimant's resourceful lawyer gained justice for
a client by exposing perjury and deceit. The court admit-
ted the evidence in National, but soundly condemned the
lawyer's conduct. 08
The viewpoint that clandestine recording is so repre-
hensible that it should be avoided, although it may be a
very effective or possibly the only effective investigative
tool in some cases, is not frivolous or without foundation.
Our system ofjustice does not always maximize truth over
competing values. Some of our rules of evidence tend to
sacrifice truth for the appearance of fairness, as is the case
... 484 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom. American Gen. Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 2007 (1988).
107 Id. at 331-32.
'- Id. at 338. The court held that "[a]n attorney's actions in secretly tape re-
cording conversations with adverse parties cannot be condoned." Id.; see also In re
An Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667 (1984)
(adopting ABA Formal Op. 337, supra note 104, and also holding that Model




with the rule of attorney/client confidentiality. Likewise,
some of our most enshrined procedures, such as an ac-
cused's right of confrontation and the privilege against
self-incrimination, sacrifice the truth for the appearance
of propriety. Adopting the view that clandestine record-
ing of conversations is unethical, however, opens other
doors. For example, is it therefore unethical for a lawyer
to instruct an insurance adjustor to record clandestinely
on video tape a claimant performing strenuous activity?
Could the lawyer in National have ethically instructed his
client to engage the lying insurance agent in a "private"
face-to-face conversation while an eavesdropper was sta-
tioned clandestinely nearby? These and other similar tac-
tics must be addressed by those who feel strongly that
clandestine recording is a gross ethical impropriety.
VI. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF SUBROGATION CLAIMS
The rights of an injured plaintiff to proceeds from a
third party tortfeasor are affected by the rights of various
subrogees, including workers' compensation carriers,
hospitalization carriers, and physicians. While some sub-
rogees intervene in the suit and are represented by coun-
sel, other subrogees do not intervene and rely, explicitly
or implicitly, upon the injured plaintiff's attorney to pro-
tect their interests. Some subrogees perfect legally bind-
ing liens, while others simply hope to be paid, and still
others place the plaintiff's attorney on notice of their in-
terest. Because the subrogees present themselves in such
a variety of configurations, a plaintiff's lawyer may be in-
voluntarily subjected to a serious conflict of interest di-
lemma. Need we be reminded that a lawyer owes the
injured plaintiff the duty of undivided loyalty?' °9
'. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
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A. Effect of Subrogation Claims
This discussion explores the effect of subrogation
claims on an attorney's ethical obligations to an injured
client. Statutes and court decisions in many states impose
a duty on plaintiffs' attorneys to protect the interests of
subrogees. What are the ramifications for the injured
plaintiff and for the subrogees? What are the ramifications
if the injured plaintiff's attorney voluntarily accepts some
obligation to protect the subrogee's claim?
Efforts of workers' compensation carriers to present
subrogation claims in third party litigation provide a use-
ful medium to explore the impact of subrogation on the
relationship between the injured plaintiff, the plaintiff's
attorney and the subrogee.1 0 Our analysis is facilitated if
we presume a case in which the value of the employee's
injury considerably exceeds the limits of available recov-
ery from the third party tortfeasor. In that instance, the
injured employee will recover less than a reasonable as-
sessment of the actual value of the injury. As a logical
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common repre-
sentation and the advantages and risks involved.
Id.
" When an employee in the course of his employment sustains an injury as a
result of negligence by a third party, all states recognize the employee's right to
bring a common-law tort action against the third party. Atleson, Workmen's Com-
pensation: Third Party Actions and the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees, 19 BUFFALO L.
REV. 515 (1970). In addition to the possibility of recovery from the third party
tortfeasor, the injured employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits.
The rationale, however, of subrogation statutes is to avoid double recovery by the
employee without granting immunity to the third party. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 74.00 (1988). Although the procedures vary,
statutory mechanisms in many states subrogate the workers' compensation carrier
to the injured employee's recovery from the third party tortfeasor. Furthermore, a
substantial majority of states now require that the workers' compensation carrier
pay a portion of the employee's attorney's fees out of the carrier's share of the
recovery from the third party tortfeasor. Id. § 74.32(a).
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deduction, we might suppose that because the injured
employee recovers less than the actual value of the injury,
the subrogees should discount their claim to subrogation
in a somewhat similar ratio. Under these circumstances,
the plaintiff's attorney is in a position to negotiate freely
between the plaintiff and the subrogees to the end that all
fairly share an admittedly inadequate recovery. Other-
wise, settlement, which is a "desirable" result, might be
impossible. If the plaintiff or any of the subrogees insist
on a full value recovery, the incentive for all other claim-
ants to accept less than full value is greatly diminished, if
not destroyed altogether. Consequently, the role the at-
torney plays in these circumstances appears to fit rather
comfortably within the guidelines established in Model
Rule 2.2.'
The appearance of propriety and fairness is not so obvi-
ous if the scenario is changed. Assume that the injured
employee, for personal reasons, insists on settling the
claim against the third party tortfeasor for far less than its
reasonably predicted collectable value. In that case, what
MODEL RULES Rule 2.2. The rule provides:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implica-
tions of the common representation, including the advantages and
risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and
obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved
on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client
will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and
that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of
the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representa-
tion can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on
other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each
client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations
relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately
informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no
longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to
represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the
intermediation.
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is the position of the attorney? Clearly, the attorney con-
tinues to have a duty to negotiate a settlement, particu-
larly if so instructed by the injured client. But how does
the attorney deal with subrogees? Is it appropriate to ap-
proach subrogees in an attempt to convince them to dis-
count the value of their claims solely because the plaintiff,
for personal reasons, does not desire to pursue the litiga-
tion to its full economic value? At this point the conflict
of interest gremlin appears. One might argue that a law-
yer cannot adequately represent the desire of an injured
plaintiff to close out the litigation for less than full value
while simultaneously representing the desire of subrogees
to recover full value of monies previously paid.
The potential for conflict of interest between the in-
jured plaintiff and the subrogees is defined by the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff's lawyer and the subrogees.
If the plaintiff's lawyer owes no duty to the subrogees be-
cause they are not clients, then there is either no conflict
or the conflict is quite minimal. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff's lawyer does owe a duty to the subrogees, then
the conflict of interest is apparent. Furthermore, the de-
gree of conflict will be directly proportional to the extent
of the plaintiff's lawyer's duty to those subrogees.
Inextricably, statutes creating subrogees' liens deter-
mine the extent of the plaintiff's attorney's duty to the
subrogees."' 2 For example, statutes in twenty-six jurisdic-
tions require an injured employee to give the compensa-
tion carrier notice of a proposed settlement and require
that the carrier consent to the settlement. 13 In a more
112 Apparently, all but two states have adopted statutes subrogating compensa-
tion carriers to the recovery by an injured employee from a third party tortfeasor.
Only West Virginia and Georgia have no subrogation statutes. Consequently, in
those states, the employee is permitted to retain both compensation benefits and
the full damages from the third party tortfeasor. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Geor-
gia Ports Auth., 155 Ga. App. 940, 274 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1980) (employer had no
subrogation rights under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act); Jones v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 145 W. Va. 478, 115 S.E.2d 129, 135 (1960) (recog-
nizing that there is no right of reimbursement to the employer when an injured
party brings suit against a third party).
"I 2A A. LARSON, supra note 110, § 7 4.17-(a) n.2. The states are Alaska, Ari-
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direct sense, the Federal Employee's Compensation Act
was amended in 1975 to explicitly place a duty on the
plaintiff's attorney to satisfy the subrogation interest of
the United States prior to distribution of any recovery
from a third party tortfeasor."1 4 Under the terms of that
statute, an attorney for an injured plaintiff who distributes
funds against which the government has a lien is liable to
the United States for conversion. 1 5 Thus, it seems rea-
sonable to postulate that a plaintiff's attorney has a cor-
relative attorney/client relationship with subrogees.
Admittedly, the attorney/client relationship may be some-
what stronger if the attorney's duty to the subrogee "cli-
ent" has been created by statute rather than arising from
some conduct on the attorney's part that caused the sub-
rogee to rely on that attorney as a matter of good faith.
However, the difference between the extent of duty cre-
ated by statute and the extent of duty created by a law-
yer's own conduct seems hardly deserving of the quibble.
B. State Court Opinions
1. Texas and Tennessee
Opinions from several state courts demonstrate the in-
extricability of the attorney's duty to the subrogee. Texas
courts hold that the "first money" recovered by an injured
employee belongs to the subrogated compensation car-
rier, and until that subrogation is paid in full, the em-
ployee has no right to any proceeds from a third party
tortfeasor.' 1 6 Consequently, an attorney who has notice
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
11 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (1982) ("No court, insurer, attorney or other person shall
pay or distribute to the beneficiary or his designee the proceeds of such suit or
settlement without first satisfying or assuring satisfaction of the interest of the
United States.").
Green v. United States Dep't of Labor, 775 F.2d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1985).
Prewitt & Sampson v. City of Dallas, 713 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986) (quoting Fort Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 156, 246 S.W.2d
865, 869 (1952)).
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of a carrier's lien and who disburses the entire recovery to
a client is subject to liability for conversion. "' In a Ten-
nessee case, the court used the statutory attorney's fees
that the subrogee owed the plaintiff's attorney as the car-
rot with which to bootstrap the attorney into an implied
obligation and duty toward the subrogee. In that case,
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gilreath,I" the court reasoned
that an employee's attorney has an implied duty to recog-
nize the employer's lien, and to distribute any recovery
proceeds in accordance with the rights of all the par-
ties.'' 9 Of course, the Tennessee court may have over-
looked the fact that disbursement of the proceeds "in
accord with the rights of all parties" is a matter of judg-
ment whenever a case is settled.12 0 How is an attorney for
an injured employee to exercise that judgment without an
inevitable conflict between the interest of the employee
client and the interest of the subrogee "client"?
2. Rhode Island
Just how extreme the conflict between the attorney's
obligation to the injured employee and the attorney's ob-
ligation to the subrogee can be is demonstrated in the
Rhode Island case of Commercial Union Co. v. Graham.12' In
Graham all parties apparently agreed that the compensa-
tion carrier was subrogated in the amount of $31,765 to
the claim of a widow against a third party tortfeasor. Nev-
ertheless, after recovering the $31,765 from the third
"1 See id. at 722.
", 625 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1981) (worker's compensation carrier brought ac-
tion to recover statutory subrogation from attorney who represented the claimant
in a third-party action).
Id. at 274.
It... follows that the statute imposes an implied duty upon the part
of the employee's attorney to recognize the employer's lien, when
known to him, and when no other attorney represents the em-
ployer's subrogation interest, [and] in the event of a recovery ... to
disburse the proceeds of such recovery in accord with the rights of
all parties declared therein.
Id.
Id.
"2 495 A.2d 243 (R.I. 1985).
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party tortfeasor by settlement, the widow's attorney
placed the money in escrow rather than directly paying
the compensation carrier. The attorney's actions forced
the compensation carrier to sue the widow and the escrow
account for judgment according to its subrogation
rights. 22 Ultimately the court held that the widow's attor-
ney breached his duty to the compensation carrier by
causing the compensation carrier to pursue its claim
against the escrow account. 2 3 As a consequence, the
court relieved the compensation carrier from paying any
portion of the attorney's fees and expenses that the widow
was forced to pay in the case. Thus, the principal client,
the widow, was unable to recoup any portion of the fees
and expenses that produced the fund for the subrogee be-
cause the lawyer violated what the court envisioned as a
duty to the subrogee.124 These facts appear to demon-
strate, rather conclusively, that at least the potential for a
serious conflict of interest exists between the injured em-
ployee and the various subrogees who are always at the
periphery of any major personal injury occurrence.
3. Minnesota
At least one jurisdiction has recognized the burden
placed upon a plaintiff's attorney and adopted a much
more sympathetic approach. In Great American Insurance
Co. v. Spoden, 125 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that
an attorney for an injured worker does not acquire a duty
to a subrogated compensation carrier without proof
"which shows a tacit understanding or implied contract
between the carrier, attorney, and client (perhaps speak-
ing through the attorney) to the effect that the subroga-
122 Id. at 244.
121 Id. at 246-47.
121 Id. The court stated that "[t]he benefits that would normally accrue to the
compensation carrier because of the efforts of the employee's attorney have been
nullified by the attorney's conduct in precipitating significant subsequent action
by the carrier to recover the money due it." Id. at 247.
1- 316 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1982).
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tion interest will be protected."' 126 Showing considerable
insight in reaching this decision, the court commented
that "mere notice" of the subrogee's claim would not be
sufficient to impose a duty upon an attorney because it
feared that such a holding would dilute a firm's duty of
loyalty to its clients. 27 Clearly, this case is an uncompro-
mising recognition of the fact that an attorney for an in-
jured worker faces an inherent conflict of interest when
significant subrogation is involved.
Similar issues related to nonstatutory subrogation
claims by health care providers have been analyzed in sev-
eral ethics opinions. Applying reasoning similar to that in
Great American, the ABA declared in Formal Opinion 163
that an attorney does not have a duty to inform a plain-
tiff's doctor and hospital, who wish to seek attachment,
that he is holding the plaintiff's money.' 28 Formal Opin-
ion 163 was grounded on the attorney's duty not to di-
vulge what is learned about the client through the
confidential relationship.' 29 Again, such reasoning is a
recognition of the conflict of interest between the worker
and the subrogated compensation carrier.' 30
126 Id. at 743.
127 Id The court stated:
Mere notice of a subrogee's claim is nevertheless not sufficient to
impose a duty in tort upon the attorneys. The firm's duty of loyalty
to its client would be unreasonably diluted were we to hold that no-
tice alone compels an attorney to act on behalf of a nonclient carrier
claiming an interest in the client's recovery.
Id.
"12 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 163 (1936)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 163], reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OPIN-
IONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 433 (1967). The Formal Opinion states:
The attorney for a plaintiff in a personal injury action should not
advise the plaintiff's doctor and hospital of the fact that a settlement
of the case has been made and that he holds his client's money and
will continue to hold it for a short while so they may attach it if the
client refuses to pay their reasonable charges.
Id.; see also Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 75 (1986), summarized
in [Manual] Law Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:4304 (Nov. 12, 1986).
12.. ABA Formal Op. 163, supra note 128.
... Note that ABA Formal Op. 163 places a duty on the attorney to notify the




A member of the South Carolina Bar inquired as to his
duty to a health care provider after both he and the client
signed a request for the release of the client's records.
The release stated that the attorney and client would
"protect [the doctor's] interest in this matter."' 3' The
ethics committee opined that the attorney was obligated
to hold the settlement proceeds for a short specified pe-
riod of time and notify the doctor of any recovery. The
committee reasoned that the client's signed request con-
stituted consent to the attorney's disclosure of the infor-
mation. 13 2 South Carolina's solution enables the attorney
to avoid participating in a fraud or misrepresentation
without violating the client's confidence.
VII. SETTLEMENT CONDITIONED ON WAIVER OR
REDUCTION OF ATTORNEY'S FEE
Occasionally, attorneys or other agents for defendants
or for subrogees resort to the tactic of offering to settle or
otherwise compromise claims in consideration for an
agreement from the plaintiff's attorney to reduce the fee
to which the plaintiff's attorney is entitled from those de-
fendants or subrogees. Examples of this tactic take sev-
eral forms. For instance, a defendant who is legally liable
for both the plaintiff's damages and plaintiff's attorney's
fees may offer to pay somewhat more in damages and
somewhat less in attorney's fees. This scenario also oc-
curs when a subrogee is obligated to pay the plaintiff's
attorney a fee in return for a benefit received, such as re-
covering the subrogation from the third party tortfeasor
or relieving the subrogee from liability for future medical
payments.' 33 If the plaintiff's attorney will forego or re-
., South Carolina Bar Advisory Comm. on Ethics, Op. 14 (1981), summarized in
[Manual] Law Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801: 7903 (Sept. 19, 1984).
142 Id.
,.1 See Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver of Attorney's Fees: Policy, Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1983) (discussing subrogation as it
occurs in litigation under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
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duce the fee owed by the subrogees, then the subrogees
may offer to forego their claims entirely.
An attorney must report all settlement offers to the cli-
ent. 34 If the offer is one of the types described above, the
attorney must report to the client that a somewhat larger
sum is available to the client if the attorney will accept a
smaller fee from the offeror. Obviously, this places the
attorney in a conflict of interest with the client. What
should the attorney advise the client to do? Should he
advise the client to reject the offer and risk receiving a
lesser sum ultimately? Or should the attorney magnani-
mously agree to accept less so that the client may reap a
benefit?
Implicitly, the rules of professional responsibility recog-
nize a lawyer's absolute right to recover his or her fee,
even if it is to the detriment of a client's interest. For ex-
ample, the rules permit an attorney to reveal a confidence
U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1986). Somewhat different considerations apply when-
ever the problem presents itself within the context of the Attorney's Fees Award
Act, because offers to compromise in consideration for a reduction of attorney's
fee liability arguably constitute a subversion of the will of Congress).
,.4 See MODEL CODE EC 7-7. EC 7-7 states:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the
cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is
entitled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority
to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within
the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.
A typical example in civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether
he will accept a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right to
plead an affirmative defense. A defense lawyer in a criminal case has
the duty to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a
charge appears to be desirable and as to the prospects of success on
appeal, but is for the client to decide what plea should be entered
and whether an appeal should be taken.
Id.; see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a). Rule 1.2(a) states:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d), and (e), and shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pur-
sued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an
offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as
to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify.
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to the extent reasonably believed necessary to collect his
fee.' 35 Another example of the rules protecting an attor-
ney's fee is the approval of liens in order to protect the
fee.' 36 An attorney is under no ethical obligation to waive
fees in order to benefit a client.
Let us reconsider the scenario in which a subrogee of-
fers to forego a subrogation claim in return for having the
plaintiff's attorney forego or reduce the fee owed by that
subrogee. The consequence of this offer is to provide the
client with a double recovery. The plaintiff receives com-
pensation from both the tortfeasor and the subrogee.
Clearly, the client has no legal right to double recovery.
In fact, the very purpose of subrogation statutes is to pre-
vent just such double recovery. 37 Therefore, if the plain-
tiff's attorney refuses the subrogee's offer, the client is
not denied any money to which he is legitimately or le-
gally entitled. Although the plaintiff's attorney is obli-
gated to report such an offer to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
attorney is not obligated to acquiesce to such an offer.
Unfortunately, this somewhat legalistic argument fails
to add significantly to the comfort of a lawyer who must
discuss these settlement offers with a client. This situa-
'1 MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(4). DR 4-101(C)(4) provides that "[a] lawyer
may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or
to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct." Id.; see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b)(2) states:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary ... to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
" ( MODEL CODE DR 5-103(A)(1). DR 5-103(A)(1) states that "[a] lawyer shall
not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litiga-
tion he is conducting for a client, except that he may... [a]cquire a lien granted
by law to secure his fee or expenses." Id.; see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.86)(1).
Rule 1.8(6)(1) states that "[a] lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the
cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client,
except that the lawyer may ... acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's
fee or expenses .... . Id.
1.7 2A A. LARSON, supra note 110, § 74.00.
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tion is made worse by the reasonable suspicion that such
offers are made by subrogees or by defendants precisely
to place a plaintiff's attorney in a conflict of interest situa-
tion with his client and to cause great discomfort between
the attorney and client. At least one ethics committee
considered such offers egregious enough to ban them as
unethical conduct per se. In Formal Opinion 94,138 the
New York Bar Association Committee on Professional
and Judicial Ethics made it unethical for defense counsel
to offer a settlement conditioned on waiver of statutory
fees that arise under statutes affecting civil rights or civil
liberties. Unfortunately, the Opinion does not address of-
fers made by defense counsel in the context of other types
of cases.
VIII. ATrORNEY'S RIGHT TO AGREE TO REJECT CLIENTS
OR CASES
With the minor exception of criminal cases, attorneys
have the right to accept or to reject clients at will.' 3 9 Fur-
thermore, a lawyer has the right to place limitations upon
the scope of services to be performed. 14  Nevertheless,
according to Model Code DR 2-108(B) it is unethical for a
lawyer to agree to restrict his practice as part of the con-
sideration for a particular settlement offer.' 4 1 It is also
-1 New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal
Op. 94 (1980), summarized in [Manual] Law Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
801:6318 (1984). The Opinion states:
In actions arising under civil rights and civil liberties statutes which
provide for an award by the court of attorneys' fees to successful
plaintiffs even upon the settlement of the case, defense counsel may
not condition such settlement on the waiver of plaintiff's statutory
attorneys' fees and may not attempt to negotiate the fees awarded
under such statutes at the same time that he is negotiating the settle-
ment of the merits.
Id.
MODEL CODE EC 2-26. EC 2-26 provides: "A lawyer is under no obligation
to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client
.... Id.
". MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(c). Rule 1.2 provides: "A lawyer may limit the
objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation." Id.
'4' MODEL CODE DR 2-108(B) (1981). DR 2-108(B) provides: "In connection
with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agree-
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
unethical for one lawyer to request another lawyer to
enter into such a restriction on future practice. 142 Thus, a
plaintiff's lawyer cannot accept a settlement offer from
the defendant's lawyer if it includes a provision stating
that the plaintiff's lawyer will forego bringing other claims
against that defendant. This rule applies although the
amount of the settlement offer may be significantly re-
duced if the plaintiff's lawyer does not agree to limit his
practice. In reality, therefore, the obligation of the plain-"
tiff's lawyer to obtain the best result (specifically, the
highest settlement offer) for the plaintiff is sacrificed at
the altar of some supposed obligation to unknown future
clients.
A. Case Law
Case law is sparse. In Shebay v. Davis,'43 a law firm filed
a class action against a refiner on behalf of bulk crude oil
producers. The allegation was that the refiner under-re-
ported the amount of oil actually received from the plain-
tiffs. As part of the eventual settlement agreement, the
lawyers for the plaintiffs agreed that they would not repre-
sent any party that had a claim against the refiner regard-
ing the mismeasurement.144
One might reasonably speculate that this agreement
was central to the settlement. Note that the plaintiff was a
large group. This fact might lessen the impact of argu-
ment that restricts his right to practice law." Id.; see also MODEL RULES Rule 5.6(b).
Rule 5.6(b) states: "A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agree-
ment in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settle-
ment of a controversy between private parties." Id.
142 MODEL RULES Rule 5.6(b); see supra note 141 for the text of Rule 5.6(b).
14, 717 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
144 Id. at 682. The agreement provided:
Cecil E. Munn and the law firm Cantey, Hanger, Gooch, Munn &
Collins hereby agree that, in consideration of this Settlement Agree-
ment, they will not represent, or in any way aid in the representation
of, any individual or class of individuals for or on behalf of any claim
made by any individual or any class of individuals against Permian
[the refiner] . . . relating to any claim involving the alleged mis-
measurement of crude oil by Permian during the Settlement Period.
1989]
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ments that the attorneys made their services unavailable
to potential clients by entering into the agreement. In any
event, the court in Shebay refused to void the agreement
or to criticize the attorneys involved.'4 5 In Jarvis v.
Jarvis, 14 6 however, neither the attorney nor the client fared
so well. Mrs. Jarvis retained attorney Bernis Terry to rep-
resent her in her divorce. She entered into a settlement
agreement which provided, inter alia, that she would not
hire the attorney for subsequent litigation against her for-
mer husband. 147
Mrs. Jarvis later sought to increase her child support
and asked the court to void the agreement so that Terry
could represent her.148 The court granted Mrs. Jarvis' re-
quest on the grounds that the contractual restriction vio-
lated public policy since it restricted Mrs. Jarvis' right to
secure the attorney of her choice.'4 9 One can assume that
the reason Mr. Jarvis paid valuable consideration to Mrs.
Jarvis and her attorney when the case was settled and the
agreement signed was because the agreement restricted
Mrs. Jarvis from securing the attorney of her choice.
Despite the language in DR 2-108(B) to the contrary,
one must strain to comprehend why a competent person,
14. Id. "The ethics of the attorneys' actions, if justifiably questioned, are for a
state bar grievance committee to decide and not for this tribunal." Id.
1- 12 Kan. App. 2d 799, 758 P.2d 244 (1988).
,47 Id. at 799, 758 P.2d at 246. The agreement provided, inter alia, that:
Nancy L. Jarvis agrees without any reservations or limitation that she
will never, under any circumstances or facts - hire, retain, or em-
ploy Bernis G. Terry or any member of any law firm he is now or is
hereafter associated with, to advise or represent her in this divorce
case ... or any other litigation against Laurence M. Jarvis. This in-
cludes but is not limited to any appeal, any motion, or any hearing
concerning any dispute or development of any nature in the divorce
case or any other litigation. In other words, never again will Lau-
rence M. Jarvis have to litigate any aspect of this case or any other
with Bernis G. Terry representing Nancy L. Jarvis or his children.
Nancy L. Jarvis will be able to retain, employ or hire any other
attorney of her choice should she desire to litigate against Laurence
M. Jarvis.
Id.
14" Id. at 799, 758 P.2d at 245.
,41 Id. at 799, 758 P.2d at 245-46.
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joined by counsel of his choice, cannot enter into an
agreement that restricts the practice of that counsel in the
future. Lawyers are not public utilities. The rules grant a
lawyer the right to refuse clients. Nevertheless, in 1968,
the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics issued an In-
formal Opinion concluding that (1) every lawyer has a
right to chose his own clients, (2) every lawyer has a duty
not to interfere with the professional employment of
other lawyers, (3) every client has a right to seek the serv-
ices of a chosen lawyer, and (4) covenants not to litigate
against the same defendant in the future are unethical be-
cause they interfere with these rights. 50 The Committee
reasoned that covenants restricting the future practice of
a lawyer also restrict his right to choose clients, and like-
wise, prevent his current or future clients from employing
him to litigate against the beneficiary of the covenant.' 5 '
In the opinion of the Committee, such restrictive cove-
nants are especially damaging to prospective clients who
need legal assistance in specialized fields of law, such as
catastrophic personal injury and products liability, be-
cause the number of attorneys available to represent such
plaintiffs is limited. 52 Surely, that assumption comes as a
surprise to the thousands of qualified lawyers who actively
participate in those fields!
B. Commentators
One commentator has presented more cogent argu-
ments to support DR 2-108(B) than those presented by
the ABA.' He postulated that the forbidden restrictive
151" ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1039 (1968), reprinted in
ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL ETHICS
OPINIONS 867-1284, at 224 (1975).
1,N1 Id.
1-12 Id. The opinion specifically referenced "condemnation cases, products lia-
bility, personal injury actions requiring the application of medical trial techniques,
the application of what is sometimes called legal medicine ...engineering
problems, family law, and corporate practice." Id.
'1- See Recent Developments - Attorneys' Settlement Covenants Not to Accept Future
Cases: Antitrust and Ethical Considerations, 18 CATH. U. AM. L. REV. 412 (1969) [here-
inafter Recent Developments]; see supra note 141 for the text of DR 2-108(B).
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covenants bar the poor from obtaining attorneys because
of the high cost of duplicating the obviously successful
work done by lawyers who accept a covenant not to sue
further. 54 The author also opined that such covenants
are too tempting if the consideration is an extra payment
by the defendant directly to the plaintiff's lawyer.' 55 Cer-
tainly, if the consideration is payment directly to the plain-
tiff's lawyer, more than protection of the poor is at stake.
Such a payment goes to the heart of the trust relationship
between attorney and client. 56 The conflict of interest in
that situation is too obvious to need further comment.
An interesting survey of lawyers in the Boston area re-
vealed that while most attorneys intended to follow the
appropriate ethical guidelines, a significant minority said
they would violate DR 2-108(B). 57 The survey encom-
passed 1000 lawyers, with more than seventeen percent
reporting that they would sign a settlement agreement
that prohibited them from representing other plaintiffs
against the settling defendant.' 5 8
The prohibition against these restrictive covenants does
not appear to benefit the insurance industry, the defense
bar, or the plaintiff's bar. Because there is no apparent
lobby with an economic motivation, one must assume that
- Recent Developments, supra 153, at 413 (because all future claimants must "du-
plicate the initial expenditures" in preparing their cases, this can "effectively de-
prive the small claimant of legitimate redress").
Id. at 416.
's" Both the Model Code and Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from accepting fees
from other than the client without the client's consent. MODEL CODE DR 5-
107(A); MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(f). Rule 1.8(f) states:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected
as required by Rule 1.6.
Id. DR 5-107(A) is substantially identical to Rule 1.8(f).
'.7 Burbank & Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 87-89 (1974); see supra note 141 for the text of DR 2-
108(B).
'-1 Burbank & Duboff, supra note 157, at 88.
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the motive, if not the rationale, for continuing the rules is
based in abstract logic and sound social policy. This au-
thor fails to perceive the logic and sound public policy.
IX. NEGOTIATION
Because many more disputes are settled by negotiations
than by trial, one might argue that being a skilled and
honorable negotiator is a larger part of lawyering than be-
ing a skilled and honorable trial advocate.' 59 Ethical trial
advocacy, however, is much better understood than ethi-
cal negotiation, with little having been written about the
latter. 60 The ethical boundaries of the relationships be-
tween negotiating lawyers are not clearly defined.
Trial advocacy would be an extremely abusive process if
carefully formulated and rigidly enforced procedures and
rules of ethical conduct did not govern. These rules and
procedures limit the enormous potential for the abuse
and exploitation of the weak by the strong that an uncon-
trolled adversary trial process would foster. For negotia-
tion, however, there are no rules of procedure, and the
rules of professionally responsible conduct are quite
primitive. A vague operational norm that a professionally
responsible lawyer should negotiate fairly does not exist.
In the words of one commentator: "Another lawyer, or a
layman who deals with a lawyer, should not need to exer-
cise the same degree of caution that he would if trading
for reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental
bazaar."1 6
1
1m, Note, Private Settlement as Alternative Adjudication: A Rationale for Negotiation
Ethics, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 503, 505 (1985). "Negotiated settlement is univer-
sally recognized as the preeminent and preferred alternative to trial litigation. It
is somewhat surprising, therefore, to observe that few of the profession's articu-
lated standards of conduct reach the ethical problems attending private settle-
ment negotiation." Id.
.. See generally Steele, Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1387 (1986).
-1 Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 589
(1985).
1989] 165
166 JOURNAL OF AIR IA WAND COMMERCE [55
A. Legal Duty to Negotiate
Implicitly, at least, some courts have imposed a legal
duty on lawyers to negotiate. These cases usually involve
insurance defense counsel and their duty to the insured to
negotiate in good faith. In Netzley v. Nationwide Mutual In-
surance Co. 162 the court held that failing to inform an in-
sured of a settlement offer or failing to negotiate
following such an offer goes to the issue of good faith. 1
63
Most ethical issues concerning negotiation, however, do
not involve breach of duty to negotiate. They involve, in-
stead, a conceal/reveal dilemma, which concerns what the
ethical lawyer may conceal and reveal during a negotia-
tion. Model Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer must not re-
veal information relating to the representation of a client
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in or-
der to carry out the representation. ' 64 Thus, Model Rule
1.6 is of little assistance because it is more circuitous than
expository.
Clearly an attorney has no ethical necessity to person-
ally believe in his presentation during a negotiation. 65
34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971).
,, Id. at 65, 296 N.E.2d at 560. The court stated that the "showing of an offer
of settlement, the absence of any reasonable negotiation of settlement following
such offer, and the failure of the insurer to inform the insured of such an offer all
are matters going to the issue of the good faith of the insurer." Id.; see also Yeo-
mans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 137 N.J. Super. 48, 324 A.2d 906 (1974).
"' MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a). The rule states that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation .... Id.
"1 See, e.g., MODEL CODE EC 7-17; MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(b). EC 7-17 states:
The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer in the
discharge of his professional duties and implies no obligation to
adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of
his client. While a lawyer must act always with circumspection in
order that his conduct will not adversely affect the rights of a client
in a matter he is then handling, he may take positions on public is-
sues and espouse legal reforms he favors without regard to the indi-
vidual views of any client.
MODEL CODE EC 7-17. Rule 1.2(b) states that "[a] lawyer's representation of a
client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorse-
ment of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities."
MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(b).
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DR 7-102(A)(5) only prohibits a lawyer from knowingly
making a false statement of law or fact during a negotia-
tion, 166 and DR 1-102(A)(4) only prohibits a lawyer from
engaging in conduct involving deceit or misrepresenta-
tion during a negotiation. 167 Therefore, a negotiating law-
yer is ethically free to advance claims and to assert
positions that the lawyer may not personally believe justi-
fied, as long as the positions are not based on either a
false statement or deceit.
Model Rule 4.1 is even more explicit in prohibiting
false statements and requiring disclosure of certain mate-
rial facts to third parties. 168  Model Rule 1.6(a) defines
confidential communications; obviously, most material
facts will be protected by attorney/client confidentiality
under Model Rule 1.6(a).1 69 The comments to Model Rule
4.1, however, state that certain types of statements, such
as estimates of price or value or a party's intentions as to
an unacceptable settlement, ordinarily are not taken as
statements of material fact. 170 Note that the comment di-
rectly controverts the part of the rule that prohibits an at-
torney from knowingly making a false statement. Thus,
an ethical lawyer is free to play the negotiating game as
that game is generally played - with a certain amount of
prevarication.
"" MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(5). The Disciplinary Rule states that "[ifn his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . [k]nowingly make a false state-
ment of law or fact." Id.
,,7 MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(4). The Disciplinary Rule states that "[a] lawyer
shall not... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation." Id.
It' MODEL RULES Rule 4.1. Rule 4.1 states that "[i]n the course of representing
a client a lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement ... or ... fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client, unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6." Id.
-l See supra note 164 for the text of Rule 1.6(a).
17,, MODEL RULES Rule 4.1 comment. The comment states: "Under generally
accepted conventions in negotiations certain types of statements ordinarily are
not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the
subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim are in this category .... " Id.; see supra note 168 for the text of Rule 4.1.
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B. Commonly Accepted Convention
Commonly understood conventions may be of more
assistance than the rules of professional responsibility. 7 1
According to generally accepted social conventions, there
is no requirement to tell the truth on all occasions. Law-
yers understand that an opponent is likely to play her
cards close to her chest, revealing no more than neces-
sary, at least initially. 72 In fact, lying is an acceptable and
almost required folkway in certain situations, such as "I'm
just fine, mother" or "So nice to see you!" Consequently,
lawyers need not feel uncomfortable because there is con-
fusion and lack of agreement over a truth-telling require-
ment. The legal profession should not reasonably be
expected to create a better solution to the conceal/reveal
dilemma than the rest of society. In fact, the legal profes-
sion's solution reflects society's solution, which is that the
need to tell the truth is situational.
Revealing half-truths with the motive to deceive is
neither commonly accepted convention nor ethically per-
missible."73 Both Model Rule 8.4(c) and DR 1-102(A)(4)-
(5) expressly prohibit a lawyer from engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion. ' 74 Nevertheless, these rules must be construed in
light of convention. Otherwise, a party represented by a
lawyer would be at a disadvantage, because negotiations
without a lawyer would permit half-truths to the level ac-
cepted during everyday negotiation. For example, a ne-
gotiator might state that the plaintiff is willing to settle a
dispute without stating that the plaintiff has a desperate
171 For a more thorough discussion, see Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17
U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1982).
,72 See H. EDWARDS &J. WHITE, THE LAWYER As A NEGOTIATOR 242 (1977); see
also Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Par-
ties, 33 S.C.L. REV. 181 (1981).
,7-1 Scofield v. State Bar of Cal., 62 Cal. 2d 624, 401 P.2d 217, 43 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1965) (attorneys disciplined for affirmatively making false representations to in-
surance companies with intent to deceive); In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328 (Mo.
1963).
'74 See supra notes 166 and 167 for the text of DR 1-102(A)(4)-(5) and note 90
for the text of Rule 8.4(c).
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and immediate need for the money from the recovery. A
reasonable, professionally responsible paradigm should
determine how much overt deception is ethically accepta-
ble during a negotiation. If a misrepresentation is one of
fact, circumstance, or condition external to the operative
facts of the case, then perhaps the misrepresentation
should be allowed within some reasonable limitations.
For example, "My client is prepared to go all the way in
the case, if that is what it is going to take to get a reason-
able recovery." On the other hand, if the overt misrepre-
sentation of fact is one directly related to an operative
element of the case, then it reasonably should not be al-
lowed; for example, "Our investigation shows that the
brakes were in good working order."
C. What Must Be Revealed
What are the ethical considerations that delineate what
a lawyer must reveal? Although there is a duty to reveal
during negotiation, the parameters of that duty are very
difficult to determine. In Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse &
Cold Storage Co. ," the court set aside a negotiated settle-
ment because the plaintiff's attorney did not reveal to the
defendant's attorney that plaintiff had died during the set-
tlement negotiations. The court held that the plaintiff's
attorney had a duty to reveal the death of his client to the
defendant's attorney prior to the final settlement negotia-
tions. 1 76 In another case, Stare v. Tate,1 77 the court re-
formed a property settlement contract after the wife's
attorney negligently made a mathematical error in a set-
tlement offer and the husband's attorney, realizing that
the error was in favor of the husband, accepted the offer
without comment. In Kath v. Western Media, Inc. 178 a court
set aside a settlement because the offering lawyer relied
,7. 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
176 Id. at 512. The court found that the attorney owed an affirmative duty of
candor and fairness to the court and to the opposing counsel, notwithstanding his
duty to his client to contend with zeal for his rights. Id.
177 21 Cal. App. 3d 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1971).
.7- 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
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upon facts set forth in a deposition which the other lawyer
knew to be false. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 79 demon-
stratesjust how pervasive among the bar the failure to dis-
close material facts may be. In Roberts, the lawyer
representing Sears failed to disclose to the inventor the
true value of this invention. 80 After selling the invention
to Sears, and subsequently discovering the misrepresenta-
tion, the inventor sued Sears. He ultimately collected
damages based upon the lawyer's misrepresentation.' 8' It
seems beyond question, therefore, that both the law and
the ethics of the profession require lawyers to disclose
material facts during the course of negotiation.
Some analogue between the problem of truthfulness in
negotiation and the problem of perjury may exist. Only
now, after years of debate and division of viewpoints, are
we approaching a consensus that a client has no right to
commit perjury, and certainly has no right to commit per-
jury with the assistance of a lawyer. 8 2 Similarly, we may
be about to approach some closure of the debate over the
role of truth in negotiation. One indication can be found
in the comments to the 1980 discussion draft of Model
Rule 4.2 which stated that fairness in negotiation means
that representations made by one party to another must
be truthful.'8 3 Although the commentary did not survive
floor debate, at least the thought was put forward as a for-
mal proposal. After all, one has to start at the beginning.
17s, 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1979).
,I' ld. at 979.
I"' d. at 980.
182 For a thorough discussion of the role of counsel in preventing perjury, see
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 353], summarized in [Manual] Law Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:101 (Apr. 29, 1987).
,.. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 (Comment Draft 1980). The comment states:
Fairness in negotiation implies that representations by or on behalf
of one party to the other party be truthful. This requirement is re-
flected in contract law, particularly the rules relating to fraud and
mistake. A lawyer involved in negotiations has an obligation to as-
sure as far as practicable that the negotiations conform to the law's
requirements in this regard.
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X. AUTHORITY TO SETTLE
In determining the extent of an attorney's authority to
settle, courts look to the law of agency."8 4 An attorney
must receive special authority to settle a client's claim.' 8 5
By virtue of employment, a lawyer has apparent 8 6 or im-
plied authority to "bind the client in procedural matters
arising during the course of the action."'81 7 Thus, an at-
torney is without authority to settle or compromise a case
without the client's consent. 8 8  Authority to settle is not
acquired by the mere fact of employment.'8 9
Authority to settle can be created by written or spoken
words or by conduct.190 For instance, the client's actions
were held to have conferred authority to settle when the
client was at the courthouse, discussed the case and vari-
ous settlement proposals, then listened to his attorney
dictate the stipulations and consent to settlement into the
record, without voicing dissent.' 9 '
If a client settles a case without joinder of the attorney,
the client probably has breached the fee contract and the
attorney probably has a cause of action for the full con-
tractual fee.' 92 At the same time, however, a provision
found in many contemporary fee contracts to the effect
that the client does not have the right to settle the case
without the consent of the attorney is of questionable va-
'" See L. PATrERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
§ 2.04, at 2-53 (1982).
18-1 Blanton v. Womencare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396, 696 P.2d 645, 650, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 151 (1985); Annotation, Authority of Attorney to Compromise Action, 30 A.L.R.2d
944, 947 n.l (Supp. 1988).
Is.. L. PATTERSON, supra note 184, § 2.04, at 2-54 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958)). "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal
relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as
agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifesta-
tions to such person." Id.
187 Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 449 P.2d 760, 762, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969);
see also Walker v. Stephens, 3 Ark. App. 205, 626 S.W.2d 200, 203 (1981); Reimer
v. Davis, 224 Kan. 225, 580 P.2d 81 (1978).
-, Annotation, supra note 185, at 944.
Walker, 3 Ark. App. at 205, 626 S.W.2d at 203.
'", Turner v. Burlington N.R.R., 771 F.2d 341, 345 (8th Cir. 1985).
Owens v. Lombardi, 41 A.D.2d 438, 343 N.Y.S.2d 978 (App. Div. 1973).
1112 Dow Chem. Co. v. Benton, 163 Tex. 477, 357 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1962).
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lidity.' 93 The best possible approach in handling the issue
of authority to settle is with a clause setting forth joint and
mutual obligations. For example, such a clause could pro-
vide that the attorney will inform client of all offers of set-
tlement, and client will counsel with attorney about the
acceptability of all offers. This clause is preferable to one
that makes it appear as if the client has forfeited his own
cause of action to the attorney.
A. Liability for Unreasonable Settlement
As a general rule, settlement advice from an attorney
that is based on "reasonably informed professional judg-
ment" protects that attorney from any subsequent mal-
practice cause of action which might arise from
allegations of inadequate settlement. 94 On the other
hand, a lawyer may be liable for negligently causing a cli-
ent to accept a settlement that is lower than what a prop-
erly represented client would have received. 95
B. Duty to Communicate Settlement Offers
Lawyers have an obligation to communicate settlement
offers to their clients. 96 Obviously, Model Rule 1.2(a),
which mandates that an attorney "abide by [the] client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement," would
be meaningless if the attorney was not required to inform
11-, State Bar of Texas Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ethical Opinion 330
(1966). "An attorney may not ethically take from his client in a personal injury
case a power of attorney which vests in him absolute control of the case." Id. But
cf. Wichita Falls Elec. Co. v. Chancellor & Bryan, 229 S.W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) (where such a provision was upheld); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:218 (West
1988) (legislatively approving such a provision in contingent fee contracts).
um D. HORAN & G. SPELLMIRE, ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DE-
FENSE § 19.03 (1985).
1' See, e.g., Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118
(1985) (at divorce trial where major issues were the property division and mainte-
nance award, attorney was not prepared to prove value of marital assets or the
amount necessary for maintenance).
... Rubenstein & Rubenstein v. Papadakos, 31 A.D.2d 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d 876
(App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 751, 250 N.E.2d 570, 303 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1969)
(failure to disclose an offer of settlement and submit to the client for acceptance
or rejection is improper practice).
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the client of an opportunity to settle. 197 The obligation to
inform the client of settlement offers is so obvious that
one court found that expert testimony was not necessary
to establish this duty as a standard of care in a legal mal-
practice case against an attorney who failed to inform a
client of settlement offers.' 98 The court observed that an
attorney has as "a matter of law, a duty to disclose and
discuss with [the] client good faith offers to settle."' 99
XI. ETHICS OF PRESENTING TESTIMONY
Presenting testimony, either during a deposition or
during a trial, is an act performed by a witness, not by a
lawyer. Each of us, however, realizes that a witness's pres-
entation carries the footprint of some lawyer with it. Law-
yers have exclusive control over questions asked of
witnesses, and lawyers have considerable control over the
content and the context of the witness' answers. Some as-
pects of presenting testimony are addressed by the rules
of professional responsibility, but other important aspects
are not discussed at all. There appears to be a kind of
"industry standard" for some of the aspects not ad-
dressed. For example, the rules address payment of fees
to witnesses, but they do not address preparing witnesses
to testify.200 Although some industry standards regarding
'11" MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a). Rule 1.2(a) states:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation .. .and shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
Id.
's Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 288 N.W.2d 443 (1979)
(plaintiff's allegation that his attorney breached the applicable standard of care
when he failed to inform the plaintiff of settlement offers prior to trial and attor-
ney's refusal to settle on the second day of trial when he received authoritzation to
do so does not require supporting expert testimony).
-. Id. at 419, 228 N.W.2d at 445.
2.. See MODEL CODE DR 7-109(C); MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(b); infra notes 201-
202, respectively, for the text of these rules.
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preparation of witnesses for testimony exist, these stan-
dards may never have been critically examined.
A. Witness Fees
Payment of fees to witnesses is one aspect of presenting
testimony expressly covered by the rules of professional
responsibility. DR 7-109(C) permits paying reasonable
fees to a witness for time and expenses, but prohibits pay-
ing these fees on a contingent basis.20 ' Obviously, the ra-
tionale is to avoid tempting a witness to slant his
testimony in the interest of recovering a fee. Curiously,
Model Rule 3.4(b), the analogue to DR 7-109(C), seems
to have retreated somewhat from the crisp clarity of DR 7-
109(C). Model Rule 3.4(b) merely prohibits offering "an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law ... ",202
Use of medical consulting services is an example of an
aspect of presenting testimony that is not covered by the
rules of professional responsibility.20 3 Over the last sev-
eral years, in response to the dramatic increase in cases
involving medical issues, these so-called "medical con-
sulting services" have appeared. Taken in isolation, a
medical consulting service is a sensible idea: a lawyer in
need of extensive medical consultations or medical evi-
dence can obtain those services for a fee. On the other
21,, MODEL CODE DR 7-109(C). DR 7-109(C) provides:
A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of
compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testi-
mony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guar-
antee or acquiesce in the payment of: (1) expenses reasonably
incurred by a witness in attending or testifying, (2) reasonable com-
pensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying,
(3) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert
witness.
ld.
.2.2 MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(b). Rule 3.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
.. falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an induce-
ment to a witness that is prohibited by law .... " Id.
2". Medical consulting services offer to contract with the client for a contingent
fee in return for medical evaluative services and testimony. In turn, these services
hire the witnesses, paying them a flat fee.
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hand, there is an unusual amount of incipient ethical is-
sues involved in utilizing a medical consulting service.
Model Rule 5.4(a) prohibits an attorney from sharing
fees with someone who is not an attorney, so the precise
nature of the contractual arrangements with a medical
consulting service is of utmost importance.0 a The in-
jured client should be the contracting party.20 5 Counsel-
ing one's client to pay the medical consulting service on a
contingent basis does not automatically violate the rules
of ethics, but it may, however, depending on the circum-
stances. 20 6 For example, the rules of ethics prohibit the
payment of contingent fees to witnesses. 0 7 Therefore, the
employees or shareholders of the consulting service can-
not testify if the service company has been employed on a
contingent fees basis. 8 Additionally, if the same group
of experts is used repeatedly by the consulting service,
those experts may acquire a stake in the outcome of the
litigation because of the frequency with which they are re-
21,4 MODEL RULES Rule 5.4(a). Rule 5.4(a) does exempt deferred compensation
to a lawyer's estate or retirement plan from the general prohibition on attorney
fee sharing. Id.
205 Connecticut Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 11
(1988) [hereinafter Connecticut Informal Op. 11] reprinted in [1988] Nat'l Rep. on
Legal Ethics & Prof. Responsibility (University Pub. of Am.) at CT:OPINIONS:52
(1988).
2'" ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 354
(1987) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 354], summarized in [Manual] Law Man, on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:107 (Nov. 7, 1987). The states are split on this
issue. See Connecticut Informal Op. 11, supra note 205 (lawyer permitted to rep-
resent clients who contract with medical consulting firm provided certain condi-
tions are met); New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 562
(1985), reprinted in II Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Responsibility (University
Pub. of Am.) at NJ:OPINION:26-28 (1985) (lawyer may not ethically solicit, en-
force, or otherwise participate in an arrangement in which the client is charged a
contingent fee by a doctor who locates expert witnesses to testify at client's trial);
State Bar of Texas Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 458 (1988), reprinted in
[1988] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Responsibility (University Pub. of Am.)
at TX:OPINIONS:8 (1988) (an attorney who aids, assists, or permits a client to
enter into a medical consulting service contract violates DR 7-109(C)).
2o7 See supra note 201.
211 See Connecticut Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 14
(1986) (contingent fee payment to consulting physician), reprinted in [1987] 1 Nat'l
Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Responsibility (University Pub. of Am.) at
CT:OPINIONS: 12 (1986).
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tained as expert witnesses by the consulting service.20 9
Because a lawyer's fee must be reasonable, 210 if the medi-
cal service company takes on responsibilities that the law-
yer normally performs, the lawyer may violate Model Rule
1.5 if he fails to make an adjustment in his fee reflecting
his reduced responsibilities.2 1 1  Furthermore, a lawyer
must exercise independent professional judgment. 21 2
Consequently, if the medical services company retains
substantial authority over decisions concerning which and
how many experts are to be used in the case, then the law-
yer's independent professional judgment may be unethi-
cally impinged.213
B. Witness Preparation
Another aspect of presenting testimony not covered by
the rules of professional responsibility is preparing wit-
nesses to testify. A quote from Marvin Frankel serves to
introduce this topic:
[W]e all know that the preparation of our witnesses is cal-
culated, one way or another to mock the solemn promise
of the whole truth and nothing but. To be sure, reputable
lawyers admonish their clients and witnesses to be truth-
2,, See ABA Formal Op. 354, supra note 206. The Committee states:
To the extent that the expert witnesses [are] used regularly by the
consultant .... and receive substantial payments for their service as
expert witnesses, they may be substantially dependent on the Con-
sultant, particularly in light of the contract prohibition imposed by
the Consultant against lawyers contacting or using the same expert
witnesses in other cases without written consent of the consultant.
The entire arrangement, considered as a whole, would appear to
raise many of the same questions as direct payment of a contingent
fee to an expert witness.
Id.
,21 MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(a) ("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.").
2,, ABA Formal Op. 354, supra note 206.
.2, See MODEL RULES Rule 2.1 (1983). Rule 2.1 states that "[in representing a
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment ...." Id.; see
also MODEL RULES Rule 5.4(a). Rule 5.4(a) provides that "[a] lawyer or law firm
shall not share fees with a non-lawyer . I..." Id.
2-" See supra note 212; see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person .... ).
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ful, at the same time, they often take infinite pains to pre-
pare questions designed to make certain that the
controlled flow of truth does not swell to an embarrassing
flood.214
Just how far may a lawyer go in "preparing" a witness to
testify and remain ethical? The rules do not tell us, except
to say that a lawyer may not engage in dishonesty or de-
ceit.21 5 Although the rules are silent, the literature is not.
Lawyers' libraries typically contain one or more books
about trial tactics. Commonly those books teach one how
to prepare a witness to testify either at trial or at a deposi-
tion.2 1 6 At this point, an industry standard comes into
play as a substitute for more formal rules. Seemingly, the
industry standard is that it is ethical to acquaint a witness
with courtroom layouts, to advise him to observe other
trials, to improve upon his personal appearance, and per-
haps each to coach his performance.
We might speculate as to why lawyers readily agree that
a certain amount of witness preparation is ethical. Per-
haps the reason is that preparation can enhance the ability
of a witness to communicate the truth to the fact-finder,
hence furthering the goals of truth and justice. If this
analysis is correct, it follows that preparation which facili-
tates a witness in either hiding or avoiding the truth is not
desirable. In the absence of rules, one cannot say that
such preparation is unethical per se. In the context of in-
dustry standards, there are clear examples of witness
preparation that encourage the witness to evade or hide
the truth. Illustrations of such preparations include the
following: providing the witness with coached rehearsals;
coaching the witness to evade giving probing direct and
relevant answers to "embarrassing" cross examination;
214 M. FRANKEL, THE ZEALOUS ADVOCATE 15-16 (1978).
2' See MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A). DR 1-102(A) states that "[a] lawyer shall not
.. [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
•.. [or] [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice." Id.
2 6 See, e.g., R. AARON & T. ROSNER, How TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL
§§ l0.01-.25 (1985); L. SMITH & L. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION
STRATEGIES § 1.46 (1985).
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changing the personal appearance, voice, and manner-
isms of a witness so that the "testifying witness" is dra-
matically different from the "actual person."
We might venture to hypothesize that such "prepara-
tion," which amounts to remaking the persona of a wit-
ness, is unethical because it is dedicated to confounding
the fact-finder's attempt to evaluate that witness's testi-
mony. A witness is only as effective as his veracity. Be-
cause veracity is never perfectly self-evident, a fact-finder
uses the persona of a witness as an important indicator of
veracity. Thus, during jury argument we often encourage
the jury to observe and reflect upon the demeanor of a
witness. If the persona of a witness is purposely improved
through "preparation," then the same character of mischief
is worked as if that witness was allowed to lie. Despite this
simile, there are no rules against altering a witness's per-
sona, but there are rules against coaching a witness to lie.
C. Perjury
Perhaps the truth is seldom known, but a witness knows
when he intends to lie. If the lawyer shares in that knowl-
edge and allows that witness to testify, then that lawyer is
corrupting the judicial process. Zealous representation
under our adversary system must not be used to achieve a
result founded on deceit. ABA Formal Opinion 353 is the
definitive statement on most aspects of perjury.21 7 This
opinion can be summarized as follows: (1) a client (or a
witness) has no right to commit perjury, and if the lawyer
anticipates perjury and cannot otherwise prevent it, the
lawyer should reveal to the court the intention of the cli-
ent (or witness) to commit perjury, and (2) if perjury is
unanticipated, but prior to the conclusion of the proceeding
before the tribunal the lawyer learns that perjury was com-
mitted before the tribunal, the lawyer must attempt to
persuade the client (or the witness) to recant, and failing
in that attempt the lawyer must disclose the perjurer to
21" ABA Formal Op. 353, supra note 182.
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the tribunal." 8
While Formal Opinion 353 helps considerably to bring
an end to speculation about the proper role of counsel in
policing perjury, it does have some limitations. First, the
opinion is based primarily on Model Rule 3.3. Not all ju-
risdictions have adopted Model Rule 3.3, and some juris-
dictions have adopted it with modifications. Secondly, the
ABA opinion is expressly limited to perjury that occurs
before a tribunal and thus neglects the serious issue of
perjury occurring during a deposition. At least two cases
have dealt with the subject of perjury during a deposition.
Both cases held that failing to reveal perjury during the
deposition process violates ethical standards.2 ' 9 Because
of the extreme significance of the issues surrounding an
act of perjury, lawyers should keep abreast of the ethical
rules in their jurisdictions, using ABA Formal Opinion
353 as the principal guideline. Unfortunately, perjury
often manifests itself unexpectedly, leaving little opportu-
nity for reflection or for extensive research on the ethical
ramifications of the perjury.
D. Cross Examination
Cross examination is the last aspect of presenting testi-
mony to be discussed. Cross examination of witnesses,
especially of those who are subjectively believed to be
truth-tellers, is another area of law practice that is not ex-
pressly governed by formal rules, although there appears
to be an "industry standard." When faced with the pros-
pect of cross examining such a witness, a lawyer is caught
between the duty to the client to be an effective advocate,
and duty to the court not to corrupt the process ofjustice.
21$ Id.
2. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 307
(Iowa 1976) (revoking the license of an attorney who knowingly permitted his
client to commit perjury in a deposition and who acted in concert to nullify a
custody decree); Smith v. State, 523 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (uphold-
ing the suspension of an attorney on the jury's findings that he advised his client
to lie in a deposition).
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No one enjoys being in this position, but it is inevitable if
one tries cases.
It seems that very few lawyers would forego entirely the
opportunity to cross examine a witness solely because
they believe the witness to be a truth-teller; hence the in-
dustry standard. There are several arguments favoring
the ethicality of the industry standard. First, truth is only
one among several competing goals of the judicial pro-
cess. Fairness and the appearance of fairness are equally
important goals.2 20 Certainly, the goal of appearance of
fairness is served by the cross examination of witnesses.
Furthermore, only in the rarest circumstance will cross ex-
amination of a truth-telling witness be effective. For the
most part, a cross-examining attorney can rely on the fact-
finder's judgment and on the opposing lawyer's rehabili-
tation of the witness to balance even a telling cross
examination.
XII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers who litigate personal injury cases must antici-
pate a range of ethical quandaries that require monitoring
and sensitivity beyond that required of lawyers who en-
gage in most other types of specialized law practice. Curi-
ously, however, collections of material aimed at helping a
personal injury litigator with this vast array of readily an-
ticipated ethical dilemmas are rare.
One reason for the dearth of writing about ethical is-
sues specific to personal injuries litigators maybe the very
vastness of the subject. This vastness results from the fact
221- Corboy, Cross-Examination: Walking the Line Between Proper Prejudice and Unethi-
cal Conduct, 10 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 5 (1986).
Truth, as an absolute, is an incidental function to the adversary pro-
cess. As a result, the bar developed and sanctioned techniques
which include devices for blocking and limiting unqualified revela-
tion of the truth. Our ethical standards command client loyalty and
adversary zeal, but there is no concomitant, positive obligation to
the absolute truth.
Id. Cf Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("The basic
purpose of a trial is the determination of truth .
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that at one point or another during the course of a typical
personal injury case lawyers on either side of the case are
apt to bump into virtually any ethical dilemma known to
the profession. Consequently, no active lawyer today can
afford to be without material at hand to serve as a guide
through perceived ethical problems.
Obviously, this paper is not exhaustive, but the hope is
that it does, in some small way, help to fill a gap in litera-
ture for personal injury litigators. There is one caveat; as
of yet there is no national normative rule of ethical pro-
priety for most of the ethical problems that present them-
selves to the practicing lawyer. Therefore, research
within the controlling jurisdiction is always necessary.
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